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Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union today, as in
the past, are as cold as the waters that separate their lands.
Their geographic proximity and the apparent complementary
nature of their economic needs would seem to dictate relatively
close relations; and yet, their dealings with each other his-
torically have been antagonistic. What explains the enmity
which these two great nations display toward each other?
Neither side is comfortable with the present situation; so
what prevents them from following a course that seems more
in line with a rational pursuance of their national interests?
In an effort to shed some light on this enigmatic rela-
tionship, this thesis will attempt to define more clearly the
elements of Japanese-Soviet intercourse by examining the prob-
lem that is today the greatest obstacle to dispelling the
animosity that exists - the Northern Territories problem. The
Northern Territories issue centers around the rival claims
of the Soviet Union and Japan to a group of four islands in
the southern Kuriles that: were occupied by the Russians after
1945. Japan's refusal to sign a peace treaty officially con-
cluding World War II with the USSR is based on Japanese demands
for the return of the islands and the Soviet position that the
issue is settled. Three and a half decades after the cessa-
tion of war, the territorial dispute is widely acknowledged

to be the greatest single obstacle to closer Japanese-Soviet
relations
.
The aim of this thesis, a case study of the Northern Ter-
ritories problem/ will be to discover some of the principal
components and catalysts that shape the dealings between
Japan and the Soviet Union. It is the hypothesis of this
thesis that the Northern Territories problem exists because
the Soviet Union and Japan subsist and function in radically
different paradigms - disparities in their historical,
economic, political, geo-strategic , and philosophical
existence. Both Japan and the Soviet Union have territorial
problems with other nations, but none have been as intract-
able and emotional as the Northern Territories. A solution
to the problem may prove to be possible only with a revision
of one of the nations' paradigms, a sweepingly significant
event.
The procedure to be used in this thesis will be to present
the historical development of the Kurile Islands (Chapter II)
,
their strategic importance (Chapter III) , and the Soviet and
Japanese claims to the disputed territory (Chapter IV) . After
presenting this background material, the Soviet perspective
of the problem (Chapter V) will be analyzed by examining the
Russian concept of territory, its interests in the Northern
Territories, and its military activities in the area. Chapter
VI will present Japan's perspective by examining the Japanese
concept of territory, their diplomatic efforts and motivations,

their distrust of Russian intentions, the role of Japanese
politics in the issue, and the involvement of the Japanese
people. Because bilateral relations never exist in a vacuum,
Chapter VII will discuss the perspectives and positions of
other regional powers. Chapter VIII will present a prognosis
for a resolution to the dispute, and Chapter IX will elucidate
the hypothesis in light of the presented material. A chronol-
ogy of events and appropriate maps are provided in order to
aid the reader in digesting the activities and settings of
the Northern Territories problem.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KURILE ISLANDS
A. THE SETTING
The Kurile Islands consist of some thirty-six islands and
thousands of tiny islets stretching from Soviet Kamchatka in
the north to the Japanese islands of Hokkaido in the south.
The archipelago is bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean
and the Sea of Okhotsk on the west. Their location dictates
that the Kuriles be a logical place for the meeting of the
Russians and the Japanese. Inaccessibility, oceanography,
and climatic conditions, as well as a general lack of interest,
have been determinants in likening the Kuriles to the end of
the world. The islands total some 10,000 square kilometers
with half of that total represented by the two largest islands
of Kunashir and Iturup. This makes the Kuriles comparable in
size to the Hawaiian Islands and about seven times larger than
the Ryukyu Islands.
Winter in the islands is characterized by cold arctic air
blowing from the continent from November to March. The Okhotsk
side of the islands receives the brunt of these blasts from
Siberia, whereas the Pacific side, protected by the mountain-
ous terrain on each island, is relatively warmer. Ice during
the winter months makes maritime use of the straits between
2the islands a hazardous adventure. Summer brings fog, rain,
and widely varying temperatures. In the northern part of the
island chain temperatures reaching the 50' s are rare, whereas
10

the southern side can experience 80-degree weather. Winds
frequently reach hurricane proportions, and storms of extremely
destructive force periodically batter the islands.
Geologically, the Kuriles are volcanic protrusions with
over 100 volcanoes on the islands, 39 of which are active.
Lava flows, "heated beaches", hot springs, and gaseous emis-
sions are found throughout the chain. Additionally, tidal
waves, strong ocean currents, and seaquakes make ocean travel
around the islands a cause for concern.
The islands possess many of the forms of plant life pre-
sent on the Asian continent. All types of deciduous and conif-
erous trees populate the archipelago, with wild grasses and
bamboo in abundance. Fruits and vegetables thrive especially
well in the southern islands, and Soviet collective farms
4have been established there. Animal life includes bears,
foxes, rabbits, and many other common species. Particularly
important in the early development of the islands were the
presence of seals and sea otters. They were vigorously hunted
for their valuable pelts and at one time were almost totally
extinct. Today, as a result of Soviet protective law, they
are populating the archipelago in ever increasing numbers.
Perhaps the greatest wealth of the Kuriles lies in its
abundant marine life. Sea vegetation, in the form of kelp,
seaweed, and algae, have historically been harvested in large
quantities for a variety of uses. Salmon, mackerel, cod,
king crab, and whales habitate the waters near the islands
11

and have provided fishermen from various lands with bountiful
catches.
B. PREHISTORY TO 18 55
The prehistory of the Kuriles is a mystery. Neither Japan,
Russia, or any other country has been able to adequately des-
cribe its human genesis and early development. It has general-
ly been accepted that the Ainu people were the first inhabitants
5
along with small groups of natives from the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Traces of Aleutian Eskimos have also been uncovered in ar-
cheological excavations. The Ainu inhabitants have gradually
been reduced throughout the years and only pockets remain
today. .
Earliest exploration of the archipelago from outside
forces is believed to have first occurred around the middle
of the seventeenth century when Dutch, Japanese, and Russians
all converged on the islands at about the same time. The
Dutch were looking for a mythical string of islands full of
gold and precious gems; the Japanese interests were in trad-
ing with the Ainu; and the Russians, as an extension of their
fur-trapping efforts in Kamchatka and Sakhalin Island, were
searching for more sources of pelts and markets to sell them.
Portuguese, Spanish, and English explorers and traders also
set foot in the Kurile Islands, but, like the Dutch, soon




Russian interests, as stated, were primarily centered
on the fur resources represented by the wealth of seal and sea
otter pelts. Later, tsarist explorers and traders began to
view the islands as stepping-stones to Japan and the enticing
trade that that mysterious land represented. The Russian
government commissioned explorations and mapping expeditions
to detail the area and determine the feasibility of establish-
ging productive contacts with the Japanese. For their part,
the Japanese, under the isolation of the Tokugawa shogunate,
had promoted trade with the Ainu, fished in the northern
waters, and generally viewed the Kuriles as a maritime buffer
with the outside world, of which there was little official
concern
.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the
Russians continued to explore and trade in the islands, pro-
viding interesting accounts of the harsh early life in the
Kurile chain. The Japanese repelled all attempts by the
persistent Russians to establish trade relations and even
attacked Russian ships in the northern waters. Shipwrecked
or lost Russian sailors, like most foreigners apprehended by
the Japanese, were frequently disposed of with the swift
stroke of a samurai sword. As English and American whalers
and foreign traders bound for the Orient began to penetrate
the Kuriles in search of whales or necessary provisions, the
Japanese realized that foreign intervention and exploration
of the archipelago must be controlled if Western contacts
were to be contained.
13

Although Commodore Perry's "black ships" signalled the
formal opening of Japan to the West, Russia had always been
a more constant force in pressing the Japanese for trade
concessions. As a check on the spreading influence of the
British in the Far East, and especially in China, the Russian
empire had continued to push hard to the east; Japan was a
natural conclusion to that effort. Tsar Nicholas I, after
having heard of the departure of the Perry expedition from
the United States, dispatched Admiral Putiatin, in charge of a
four-vessel force, to Japan in hopes of either beating the
Americans to the punch or, if too late, protecting Russian
ginterests in the region. Putiatin landed in Nagasaki on
21 August 1853; his instructions were threefold: (1) open
diplomatic relations with the Japanese, (2) open the way for
trade relations between the two countries, and (3) settle the
boundaries and territorial ambiguities of Sakhalin Island and
the Kuriles. After presenting his demands to the Japanese
officials, Putiatin (like Perry) departed with a promise to
return.
Meanwhile, Turkey declared war on Russia in October, 1853,
and the French and British joined the Turks in what was known
as the Crimean War. Now English and French war vessels in
the Far East patrolled the waters of the Sea of Japan, the
Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk in search of Russian ships;
Russian ground troops also were committed to the Crimean area.
So when Admiral Putiatin sailed into Shimoda on 4 December
14

1854, the situation was entirely changed. Russia was anxious
9
to conclude a treaty, as its interests lay in the west. On
the other side of the bargaining table Japanese thought had
turned to using the Chinese tactic of combating foreigners
with other foreigners, and thus they too had decided that a
treaty was in their best interests. The Treaty of Shimoda
between Russia and Japan was signed on 7 February 1855, pro-
viding generally the same concessions as the Perry treaty.
Territorially, it provided that the island of Sakhalin would
remain in joint possession of both countries, and the Kurile
Islands were divided between Iturup and Urup Islands, with
the southern part going to Japan, the remainder to Russia.
So now the legal status of the Kurile Islands had been firmly
established, not to the total satisfaction of both parties,
but to the temporary appeasement of each.
•
C. 1855-1875
During the next twenty years, 1855-1875, each section of
the Kuriles was absorbed into its respective sphere of
control. The southern Kuriles were integrated into the
Japanese empire but were only loosely administered. The
shogun and subsequent officials of the Meiji period made no
effort to militarily or commercially develop the islands.
The Russians did little more with their section, although
the government dispatched cartographers and surveyors to
fully ascertain the extent of its possessions . The new
15

area of contention between Japan and Russia was Sakhalin. The
Treaty of Shimoda (185 5) had provided for joint possession,
but soon both parties concluded that this was an unsatisfactory
arrangement and should be changed . Both pushed their arguments
for sovereignty over Sakhalin, and the need for compromise
was soon apparent. So on 7 May 1875, Japan and Russia signed
the Treaty of St. Petersburg giving exclusive possession of
Sakhalin to Russia and sole ownership of the Kuriles to
Japan. Many Japanese denounced the treaty as an unnecessary
renunciation of the long-standing Sakhalin claims for islands
already considered the "natural" fiefdom of Japan. But in
light of the fact that Japan was certainly in no position to
challenge the power of tsarist Russia, the exchange was
probably a pragmatic exercise in Japanese diplomacy.
D. JAPANESE DOMINATION
With the entire archipelago reverting to Japanese owner-
ship, the Kuriles were administratively incorporated into the
Hokkaido district. The islands quickly seemed to present
more problems than their apparent value; a meaningful census
of the inhabitants was difficult enough, much less their total
co-option into the rapidly changing world of Meiji Japan. But
the greatest problem came from the poachers and pirates roam-
ing the northern Pacific waters. Gradually, more and more
Japanese came to the islands, and the native Ainu gave way to
12absorption, disease, and emigration. There was no concerted
16

effort by the government to colonize the islands until the
1930 's, but private institutions and land-hungry peasants
combined their desires in chartered Japanese expeditions to
establish settlements.
The Japanese began to realize the sizeable returns from
the marine life that now lay in their hands. To a nation
that depends to a significant degree on ocean production,
this was a true blessing. Japanese businesses soon began to
exploit the fishing grounds around the islands; not only
were the Japanese consumers provided for, but also markets
as far away as North and South America. Elaborate canneries
were built, and fishing fleets blanketed the waters off the
islands. By 1939 the Kuriles' permanent inhabitants numbered
14
some 19,000 Japanese.
During the 1930' s the Japanese government began, for
security reasons, to close off the islands to visits by
foreigners. The first airfield was established on Iturup in
1925, and harbors for military shipping were first constructed
in the late 19 2 ' s. As the Japanese empire began to expand
its political and military force, the Kuriles' strategic
location soon became recognized as a way to cut Russian access
to the Pacific Ocean from its eastern-most provinces, and as




E. WAR IN THE KURILES
The years 1941 to 1945 saw the Kuriles involved in the
Second World War; it was this conflict that would shape the
destiny of the archipelago into the present loggerhead between
Japan and the Soviet Union. During World War II the Kurile
Islands were important military assets for the Japanese. As
the Soviet Union had always been considered the greatest
threat to Japan by the Japanese, the islands were strategic
naval jewels. Japan could quite easily limit Soviet access
to its eastern provinces to the single-line Trans-Siberian
railroad. Japan felt as long as it held the Kuriles and
controlled the three straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima)
in the region, the Soviet Union would never be a maritime
power. But just as the Russian attention was being turned to
Hitler's Germany, so was Japanese attention being diverted
to increasing concerns with the United States. Iturup's
Hitokoppa Bay was the marshalling area for Admiral Nagumo '
s
carrier force that steamed southeast to attack Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 1941. 3 Its natural anchorage and usual blan-
keting fog and rain made a perfect rallying area that eluded
enemy detection. Paramishir Island (northern Kuriles) served
as the springboard for the Imperial Army's attack on the
Aleutian Islands on 8 June 1942 (the attack serving as a
diversion to the main effort against Midway Island) . Soon,
however, American bombers (July 194 3) and naval bombardment
(February 1944) began to reduce the Kuriles to impotence and
18

eventually cut the islands entirely from the rest of Japan.
Troop strength reached its zenith in August 1944 when 60,000
Japanese soldiers manned the island outposts. From that
point until their invasion in August 1945, the garrisons were
gradually reduced until 25,000 Imperial soldiers awaited the
1 fi
onslaught of either Russian or American forces.
Long before any actual invasion of the Kuriles had even
been considered, planning at the highest Allied levels had
been conducted on how to dispense with a defeated Japan's
territorial possessions. In a series of four summit meetings
of the Allied heads of state, the fate of the Kuriles and all
of Japan's outlying areas was sealed.
In late November 1943, President Roosevelt, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill met in Cairo,
Egypt, to parley their thoughts concerning the pursuance of
the war against Japan and actions to be taken upon her defeat.
A statement was issued by all parties on 1 December 1943 that
expressly stated that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadore
Islands would be taken from Japan and returned to China.
That was followed by, "Japan will also be expelled from all
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."
Although the statement did not directly name the Kurile
Islands, it would have tremendous importance in weighing
Soviet claims to the islands.
Leaving Cairo and Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt and Churchill
proceeded to Teheran, Iran, to meet Soviet Premier Joseph
19

Stalin concerning the procedures for war and peace in the
European Theatre. Although not among the primary topics of
the meeting, the subject of the Kuriles was discussed between
Roosevelt and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, with
Roosevelt erroneously stating that the Kuriles had been taken
from Russia by Japan in 1905 as a result of the Russo-
18Japanese War. At the conference Roosevelt later suggested
to Stalin that a joint military seizure of the Kuriles might
be a productive move. Stalin ignored the suggestion because
of his anxiety in the European Theatre. In late 1944 Stalin
informed Averell Harriman, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, that as
a price for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, all
of Sakhalin Island and all of the Kurile Islands should be
"returned" to the Soviet Union as a means of protecting her
19Far Eastern interests. To the Allied leaders, the "return"
of the Kuriles had become a legitimate claim.
The three leaders met again at Yalta in February 1945, for
the purpose of reevaluating the war effort, agreeing on the
conditions for Soviet participation in the war against Japan,
and the general settlement at the cessation of hostilities.
The secret portion of the agreement signed on 11 February
1945 (and not made public until 11 February 1946) that dealt
with the Kurile Islands stated, "The Kurile Islands shall be
20handed over to the Soviet Union." Stalin had stated during
the conference, "I only wanted to have returned to Russia
21
what the Japanese have taken from my country." - And
20

Roosevelt, still under the mistaken impression that the Kuriles
had been ripped away from Russia in 1905, heartily agreed to
22help "get back that which was taken from them." Stalin had
thus won the Kuriles through American misinformation and pre-
occupation with more important matters. It was a masterpiece
of Soviet political chicanery. The agreement at Yalta was
regarded by the Russians as a total transfer of the islands,
by the Americans as a promise to support Russian claims at a
peace treaty, and by the Japanese as invalid because of their
absence from deliberations.
Atomic bombs dropped on 6 and 9 August 1945 and the Soviet
Union's declaration of war on 9 August necessitated the
Japanese emperor's decision to end the war; in doing so, Japan
had to accept the Potsdam (Conference of Berlin) Declaration
that stated, among other stipulations, "The terms of the Cairo
Declaration shall be carried out, and Japanese sovereignty
shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,
23Shikoku, and such adjacent minor islands as we determine."
Mongolia, Manchuria, and northern Korea were quickly occupied
by Soviet troops; Sakhalin and the Kuriles were "liberated"
on 17 August 1945. There was resistence from Japanese ground
forces, but the entire archipelago was totally subdued by
4 September. With few exceptions, civilians on the islands
had already abandoned their homes for the relative safety of
Hokkaido, but military personnel were taken prisoner and






The Soviets quickly solidified their hold on the islands.
Russian civilian settlers began arriving in October and quickly
confiscated the abandoned property. Soviet border guard units
were also stationed on the islands. On 20 September 194 5 the
Soviets declared that the entire Kurile archipelago was now
Russian territory, and the islands' occupants participated in
25
the 1946 election of the Supreme Soviet.
The Russians soon began to realize the intrinsic value of
the Kuriles. The rich maritime resources, the canneries, and
the docking facilities were, and are now, of immediate and
lasting importance in providing food for all parts of the
USSR. Seasonal workers, mostly students, have since been
used in the summer months when fishing and canning operations
are the heaviest. Tourists from the Soviet Far East are also
drawn to the islands; the hot springs and warm beaches of
Kunashir have made some of the islands resorts from the rigors
of Siberia. But, of course, the primary importance of the
Kuriles from the Soviet perspective has been the strategic
positioning of the archipelago.
Post-war feelings concerning the Kuriles have consistently
sparked deep emotions in both Japanese and Russians. After
the secret agreement portion of the Yalta conference was made
public in 1946, many Japanese were outraged and called for the
return of the islands. This protest, identified by the
Japanese as the Northern Territories issue, was scon generally
22

restricted to a demand for the return of the southern four
islands of the chain (the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashir,
and Iturup) ; these four had served as home for 90% of the
2 6
Japanese that lived in the Kuriles. The first Japanese
government position paper on the subject was released in 1949;
it stated that Yalta had no basis in international law and
27
asserted Japanese claims over the four southern islands.
During the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951, Prime
Minister Yoshida renounced the claims to the Kuriles that had
28
so recently been enunciated. The Japanese government later
stated that Yoshida, when referring to the Kuriles, had meant
the chain of islands from Urup Island northward to Kamchatka,
but not the southern four islands because they were always
29inalienably Japanese. The Soviet Union, though not a
signatory of the peace treaty, used the Japanese position at
San Francisco as another building block in their case for
possession. The Japanese and the Russians continually debated
the issue throughout the 1950 's. The United States provided
the Tokyo government a requested aide-memoire on 7 September
1956 supporting the Japanese position and their claims for
the southern four islands. However, during the Cold War
era, this action probably did nothing more than solidify the
positions of each side.
A peace declaration (not a peace treaty) was eventually
signed between the Soviet Union and Japan on 19 October 1956,
deferring the issue of the Northern Territories to the
23

conclusion of a permanent peace treaty and conceding the return
31
of the Habomais and Shikotan upon consummation of the treaty
.
J
Later, the conditions for the return of the Habomais and
Shikotan were expanded; on 27 January 1960 the Soviets stated
that before the two islands would be returned, all foreign
32troops in Japan (meaning American) must permanently leave.
The official return of Okinawa from the United States to
Japan on 15 May 1972 signalled the concentration of all
Japanese irredentist claims on the Kurile Islands. Govern-
ment missions from the Japanese cabinet and the Diet have
attempted to acquire Soviet concessions in returning the
southern Kuriles; all efforts have been stone-walled by the
Russians. Civic action groups and quasi-governmental missions
to Moscow also have been fruitless. Indeed, the only response
from Moscow has been the steady build-up of military forces
and permanent facilities throughout the islands. The Japanese
have countered by intensifying the campaign for the return of
the Northern Territories and by declaring the 7th of February
an annual day for protests and demonstrations in support of
fc .
. . . 33their ciairas.
24

III. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE KURILES
The strategic value of the Kurile Islands in the North-
east Asia region has been widely recognized by all players,
but an assessment of exactly what that value encompasses is
in order. The Russians more than any other power were the
earliest proponents of the Kurile 's strategic worth; and since
they are now the owners of the archipelago, an examination
from their perspective should prove enlightening.
In the mid-18th century Russian naval officers had pro-
posed establishment of a naval station as a guard for the
eastern reaches of the empire and as a northern approach to
Japan. Admiral Stepan 0. Makarov, who extensively surveyed
and mapped the Kurile straits, had expressed the idea in the
late 1880' s that the Kuriles were the key to communications
34between the Pacific Ocean and the Russian Far East.
Marshall Stalin at the close of World War II spoke of their
significance:
Henceforth, the Kurile Islands shall not serve as a means
to cut off the Soviet Union from the ocean or as a base
for a Japanese attack on our Far East, but as a means to
link the Soviet Union with the ocean and as a defensive
base against Japanese aggression . 35
Subsequent Soviet leaders have been as unequivocal in their
pronouncements of the key position played by the Kuriles in
the geo-strategic projection and protection of Soviet power
in the Pacific. The advancement of modern weapons technology




The Kuriles serve as an extension of Soviet power into
Northeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. They have been called
by Soviet writers a "1000 kilometer Cossack saber" and a
3 fi
Russian "screen of steel." They also serve as a concrete
reminder, especially to the Japanese, that the Soviet Union
is an Asian power, too, and plans to remain so. The Kuriles
provide for a partial encirclement of Japan; especially vul-
nerable is the Japanese northern island of Hokkaido, poten-
tially threatened by Soviet continental forces on the west,
Sakhalin Island on the North, and the Kuriles on the east.
The Kuriles also are in a relatively good position to
interdict air and sea lines of communication between North-
east Asia and the rest of the world, particularly the United
States. The Soviets experienced this first-hand when, during
World War II, Lend-Lease supply flows from the United States
were restricted because of Japanese possession of the Kuriles
Soviet tenancy also graphically reminds the Japanese of their
vulnerability as an insular nation and the potential threat
that the Soviets pose to the severance of the strands of
economic survivability.
B. NAVAL IMPORTANCE
From a naval perspective, the importance of the Kuriles
can hardly be overestimated, for the value of the islands
lies as much in their straits and adjacent waterways as in
26

the islands themselves. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is geo-
graphically choked in its access to and from the Soviet Far
East and the Pacific Ocean. Out of the Sea of Japan into
the Pacific or the Sea of Okhotsk or in carrying out the
maritime replenishment of the base at Petropavlosk , Soviet
naval forces must pass through one of three straits (Soya,
Tsugaru, Tsushima) , none of which they fully control. Al-
though Japan has observed uninterrupted Soviet passage through
the Soya and Tsugaru Straits by not extending territorial water
claims and has viewed the Tsushima Strait as international
waters, the potential for military closure of the straits in
concert with the United States and/or another power is indeed
37
a consideration for the Soviets. In 1979, 320 Soviet naval
vessels passed through on of these three straits (Soya-130,
3 8
Tsugaru-50, Tsushima-140) . Moscow is 5000 miles from
Vladivostok; the thin threads of overland transportation are
tenuous and in need of support from Soviet maritime assets.
Petropavlosk has no overland route and is totally dependent
on maritime supply in its operation as a submarine base.
As stated previously, the naval value of the Kuriles is
found as much in the twenty navigable straits as in the islands
themselves by linking the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin Island, and
the Pacific Ocean. Now with possession of the Kuriles, Soviet
vessels leaving the Sea of Japan through the Soya or Tsugaru
Straits or leaving the Sea of Okhotsk can steam uninterrupted
through the Kurile straits to the open ocean. Indeed, Russian
27

possession of the Kurile chain has made the Sea of Okhotsk
a Soviet lake; unimpeded entry and egress from Okhotsk pro-
vides Soviet D-class SSBN's a relatively safe haven enabling
the SS-N-18 nuclear warhead missile to target practically all
of the continental United States and all East Asia with ample
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maneuver space to lessen their vulnerability. Since most
of the Pacific Fleet's submarines are based out of Petropavlosk
,
the Kuriles are critical for maintaining the umbilical between
the home port, Okhotsk, and Vladivostok.
The Kuriles also provide the Soviets with excellent harbors,
ports, and rendezvous areas for staging naval operations. As
mentioned before, Iturup's Hitokappu Bay was the marshalling
area for Admiral Nagumo ' s carrier task forces enroute to Pearl
Harbor. Simushir's (central Kuriles) Buroton Bay, shrouded
by fog, protected from bad weather, and easily accessible to
the Pacific provides an excellent submarine base. Although
other areas in the Soviet Maritime Provinces, North Korea,
and Kamchatka also provide adequate facilities, the fact that
these Kurile stations are ice-free year-round makes them even
more valuable.
C. AIR IMPORTANCE
Stationing of air forces on the Kuriles has given the
Soviets platforms for sophisticated electronic surveillance
of parts of Japan and the United States Seventh Fleet. In
any conflict involving the Soviet Union and Japan or the
United States, Kurile-based aircraft would be heavily
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utilized in the battle for air superiority and for inter-
dicting Japanese air lines of communication with outside
forces
.
Soviet island-based aircraft also extend the effective-
ness of her naval forces. Being, at least for now, an anti-
carrier, anti-submarine (ASW) , and, in relation to the United
States Navy, a nonautonomous force, the Soviet Navy is, to a
40heavy degree, dependent on land-based aircraft. Although
steps have been taken by the Soviets to rectify this problem
by stationing the ASW carrier Minsk in the Pacific Fleet and
development of an American-style catapult carrier, until the
problem is solved the Kuriles will remain an important element
41in providing air cover and extending ASW capabilities. The
presence of TU-22M (Backfire) bombers in the region, capable
of staging from the Kuriles, presents Japanese and American
planners with difficult problems for air defense throughout
the North Pacific.
D. GROUND IMPORTANCE
If contemplated by the Soviets, the Kuriles could become
an excellent platform for staging an assault on Hokkaido.
Amphibious assault, parachute drop, heliborne assault, or a
mechanized thrust across the 17 kilometer frozen channel
(winter only) separating Kunashir from Point Notsuke on
Hokkaido are all possibilities that are feasible through
Soviet possession of the Kuriles. Short of all-out invasion
29

of Hokkaido or other parts of Japan, the islands provide
Soviet ground forces the geographic opportunity to seize and
hold selected land areas bordering the important maritime
straits or striking at selected Japanese Self Defense Force
(SDF) sites considered to be necessary. Quick strike opera-
tions against the northern tip of Hokkaido to secure the Soya
Strait, against the Shiretoko Peninsula (eastern Hokkaido)
,
or against the Nemuro Peninsula (opposite the Habomais) to
protect the Kunashir Channel could be effectively launched
from the Kurile Islands.
E. INTELLIGENCE IMPORTANCE
The Kuriles provide a vantage point for monitoring maritime
traffic in and out of the Sea of Okhotsk through the Kunashir
Channel; air traffic leaving and entering Japan is also easily
tracked. As mentioned, Soviet intelligence-gathering aircraft
are stationed on the Kuriles. The Soviet KGB office located
on the island of Kunashir has established an apparatus for
examining Japanese newspapers, periodicals, and other articles
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of information obtained from Japan.
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IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR POSSESSION OF
THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
With a basic knowledge of the historical development of
the Kurile Islands, a closer examination of the claims of
each side is in order. Although there is no unanimous
opinion in Japan as to exactly which islands the "Northern
Territories" involves, there is, as will be seen, general
agreement that the southern four islands (the Habomais,
Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup) must be returned to Japan.
Because they represent the most intense (and most realistic)
focus of the Japanese argument and represent the Japanese
government's official target for return, the analysis of the
Japanese claims will be confined to the southern four islands,
hereafter referred to as the Northern Territories.
A. THE RUSSIAN SIDE
The Soviet claims are based on World War II agreements
(Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam) , the San Francisco Peace Treaty
of 1951, and the de facto military situation at the conclusion
of hostilities in 1945. The case for Soviet possession of
43the Kuriles consists of the following:
1) Early discovery of the Kuriles was accomplished by
Russian explorers and traders. As early as 16 32 Russians
were trading with the Ainu inhabitants of the Kuriles, before
any of the natives had even heard of a place called Japan.
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2) Later, in the mid-1700 's, the southern Kuriie Ainu
welcomed the Russians as liberators from the "oppressive"
Japanese
.
3) In the years of 1766 to 1769 the Russians first
collected tribute from the Ainu on Iturup and Kunashir Islands
and in 1770 the Ainu on the Kuriles from Urup Island north-
ward were claimed as subjects of the Russian Tsar.
4) The Shimoda and St. Petersburg Treaties were negated
by Japanese aggression in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
5) The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 was
nullified by Japan when it aided German aggression against
the Soviet Union.
6) The Soviet Union did endorse the Atlantic Charter
concept of non-territorial aggression, but it added its own
qualifications that excluded territories such as the Kuriles
from its policy.
7) The Cairo Declaration denied all territory to Japan
gained by violence or greed. Since the Yalta agreement hand-
ing the Kuriles to the Soviets is based on the concepts of
the Cairo meeting, the Allied powers recognized that the
Kuriles had been illegally seized by the Japanese and right-
fully belong to the Soviet Union.
8) In attacking the Kuriles in 1945 and occupying the
islands, the Soviet Union was fulfilling solemn agreements
consummated at Yalta and Potsdam. The Kuriles were bought
and paid for with Soviet blood.
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9) The Kurile Islands issue was settled once and for
all by the agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam. These
agreements were subscribed to by all the Allied powers, not
just the Soviet Union.
10) When Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, she
formally renounced her claims to the Kuriles. This renuncia-
tion was cemented when Japan accepted the conditions of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Even though the Soviet
Union was not a signatory of the peace treaty itself, Japan
signed the treaty and is legally bound by its provisions.
11) The Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup have,
despite Japanese revisionist protests, been part of the Kurile
chain of islands. The Japanese tactic of trying to separate
these four islands from the rest of the Kuriles is a thinly
veiled attempt at deception.
12) As far as the Habomais and Shikotan are concerned, the
renewal of the U. S . -Japanese Security Treaty in 196 negated
the pledge of the Soviet Union to return the islands at the
conclusion of a peace treaty.
13) Continued assertion of Japanese ownership of the
islands is merely anti-Soviet neo-miiitarism forwarded by
revanchist Japanese who are opposed to favorable relations
with the Soviet Union. The Japanese people understand that
the issue is settled; only those interested in stirring-up




3. THE JAPANESE SIDE
The Japanese claim that the Northern Territories are
44historically, legally, and culturally part of Japan. The
Northern Territories are considered "inalienable" Japanese
lands and command a considerable backing by the government
and the public for their return.
The explanation for claiming Shikotan Island and the
Habomais Island group is the assertion that these islands
have always been part of Hokkaido; at no time have they been
considered or been identified with any part of the Kuriles.
The Japanese point to the Soviet concession in the 1956 Joint
Peace Declaration (that the Habomais and Shikotan would be
returned at the conclusion of a peace treaty) as proof of
Soviet acknowledgement that these islands are separate from
the questions of Kurile ownership and have always been part of
the four main Japanese islands. Thus, as the argument goes,
the Habomais and Shikotan are not even to be negotiated at a
peace treaty conference; when the Potsdam Declaration was
accepted by Japan, and she was restricted to the four main
islands and "minor islands" to be determined, the Habomais
and Shikotan were without question to remain part of Japan.
From Japanese eyes, only Russian aggrandizement has imprisoned
these two into the world of the Northern Territories.
The case for Japanese rights to Kunashir and Iturup are
considerably more involved but still based on the claim
that these, too, have always been Japanese lands, subject
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only to jurisdictional control of Japan. The Japanese, in
building their case, present the following points:
1) 17th century maps of both Japan and Russia depict the
Kurile Islands as belonging to Japan.
2) The Matsumae clan of Hokkaido developed Kunashir and
Iturup through trade with the Ainu inhabitants.
3) The Tokugawa shogunate finally incorporated Iturup
and Kunashir into the Hokkaido province in 1800. No Russians
had ever exercised any control over these two islands.
4) A Russian Imperial Ordinance of 4 September 1821
stating that Russian navigational and communications rights
extended only as far south as Urup Island is factual evidence
that the Russians never controlled any part of the Northern
Territories.
5) The Treaty of Shimoda (1855) firmly established the
boundaries in the Kurile Islands; the Russians formally
recognized that Kunashir and Iturup belonged to Japan.
6) From the 18th century, Iturup and Kunashir had been
administered as an integral part of the Japanese Islands, not
as a colony such as Sakhalin.
7) By the precepts of the Atlantic Charter, which was
agreed to at least in principle by all of the Allied powers,
a policy of territorial non-expansion was to be followed upon
conclusion of the hostilities of World War II.
8) As a result of the Cairo Conference (1943) , the Allies
again stated to "have no thought of territorial expansion";
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Japan was to relinquish all territory "taken by violence and
greed." This, of course, could not apply to Kunashir and
Iturup or any other part of the Kuriles. The Shimoda and
St. Petersburg Treaties peacefully determined the possession
of these islands; thus, none of the Northern Territories can
be denied Japan as a result of the Cairo Declaration.
9) The Yalta Agreement and its dictate to have the Kuriles
"handed back to the Soviet Union" has no legal basis; Japan
was not a party to the deliberations, which were secret, and
thus not legally bound by its provisions. Anyway, the Yalta
Agreement was merely a statement of objectives by three heads
of state and not internationally sanctioned directives.
Changes of territory can only occur as a result of a peace
treaty between the belligerents.
10) Soviet actions at Yalta were in contradiction to the
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact which assures the territorial
integrity and nonaggression of each power. The pact was to
have remained in effect until April 1946 but was unilaterally
broken by the Soviet actions at Yalta, Potsdam, and the Russian
declaration of war on Japan.
11) The Potsdam Declaration, accepted by Japan, restricted
postwar Japan to the four main islands and such minor islands
as were to be determined by the Allies; this, in accordance
with the statements of non-territorial expansion, means that
Iturup and Kunashir were to remain Japanese. The status of




12) At the end of World War II, some 16,000 Japanese
civilians inhabited the Northern Territories; until the end
of the war, no Russian had ever resided in the Northern
Territories.
13) The incorporation of the contested islands into the
Soviet Union are unilateral actions taken as a result of
Soviet aggrandizement and have no basis in international law.
14) At the San Francisco Peace Conference (1951) Japan
renounced all titles and claims to the Kuriles and southern
Sakhalin, except Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, or the Habomais
as they had never been part of the Kuriles. That surfaces
the question of what are the Kuriles. The term Kuriles has
been defined twice in international treaties prior to 1945
(Shimoda and St. Petersburg) as meaning the islands running
from Shumshu in the north to Urup in the south. None of the
four contested islands have ever been considered as being part
of the Kurile Islands.
15) As for Japan renouncing claims to the Kuriles at San
Francisco, in no way can the Soviet Union claim any part of
the Northern Territories on that basis, as the USSR refused
to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
16) Not until the Soviet Union and Japan negotiate a peace
treaty will the final disposition of the islands be determined




Both sides believe in their right to the islands and have
built their cases to support their contentions. More important
than the legalisms involved are the foundations for the con-
victions and motivations for the two governments ' positions




V. THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
The Northern Territories, from the Soviet perspective,
are a continuation of the Russian concern for the security of
the nation. The bitter experiences of war, invasion, and
foreign intervention have led the Russians to seek territorial
buffers to protect the heartland. Although possessing some
intrinsic wealth, the Northern Territories and their value to
the Soviets are an extension of this desire to shield the
state and its people. The Soviets, in congruence with the
pursuit of security, have attempted to use the Northern
Territories to enhance their political and economic situation
in the Far East.
A. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THEIR TERRITORY
One of the sources of the seemingly insoluble nature of
the Northern Territories problem has been the divergent view-
points held by the Russians and the Japanese concerning the
concept of national territory. The officialdom of the USSR
has tended to regard (as did their imperial predecessors)
the Soviet lands outlying the Great Russian homeland as being
peripheral to the heart and soul of Russia, and thus an area
to be dominated for the protection of the Great Russian
center. The Kuriles are viewed as a legitimate wartime
expansion of this protective ring.
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1. The Territorial Concept
The physical boundaries of what we call Russia or the
Soviet Union were not intrinsically important to the Muscovy
court culture since its emergence in the 13th century anymore
than they are to the current leadership in the Kremlin
45 •
today. Certainly boundaries and the extension of the empire
are important political objectives of the leadership and the
people, but the buffer areas surrounding the Russian heart-
land are not considered inviolable Russian territory. Just
as the Muscovy court concerned itself with the maintenance of
clan supremacy and security as all-important, so does the
Great Russian ethnic group today view itself as the vibrant
heartland of the Soviet Union; and outlying areas exist to
protect the heart. Lacking natural boundaries, survival has
depended on expansion. Outlying buffer areas have been viewed
as being elastic - expanding and contracting in concert with
4 fi
the varying conditions bearing upon the nation. The elastic
nature of the state has been exacerbated by the presence of
countless ethnic minorities, foreign pressures and invasions,
and internal strife.
There evokes from the Soviet leadership no strong
concept of inherent territory for the outlying areas. The
geographical influences dictate their stance on territorial
expansion, and thus the buffer areas. The "defenseless
steppes" have taught the lesson that shielding the heart is a
47
matter fixed only by military power. The Russian influence
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in East Europe, Afghanistan, Vietnam, North Korea, India,
and Mongolia is the manifestation, in varying degrees, of the
preoccupation (some say paranoia) of "expand or die." The
Kuriles, including the Northern Territories, are a continua-
tion of the desire to expand the empire, for by doing so the
heart is protected to an even greater degree.
The Kuriles are not considered by any contingent of
Russians to be inherent Russian territory; the Soviets pri-
vately acknowledge that their historical claims to the islands
are weak. They make their claims based upon a desire to
obtain a sustainable outlet to the Pacific; to pressure and
influence the action in Japan, China, and all of the Far East;
to depend on expansion as the best security policy; and to
reap the rewards of victorious Soviet military engagements.
2. A Result of War
Commensurate with the belief in expanding national
boundaries is the Soviet contention that the Northern Terri-
tories are their legitimate prize for their World War II
involvement, a recognized part of the spoils of war, and part
of the Soviet Union by right of conquest. In 197 3 the then
chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet
stated to a visiting Japanese delegation, in reference to the
Northern Territories, that "those who want to alter the
present boundaries, which the Soviets gained by the sacrifice




Russian officials add that all the Northern Territories
campaigns and demonstrations by the Japanese cannot simply
cancel the reality of the results of World War II. They
wonder by what right do Japanese revanchists have to attempt
to subvert a situation that was authenticated not only by the
signatures and seals of international agreement (Cairo, Yalta,
Potsdam, and San Francisco) , but also by the blood of the
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Russian people. Consequently, Soviet officials have urged
the Japanese to acknowledge the "effective rule" of the ter-
ritories they have presided over for the last three and a half
decades
.
When the Soviets argue that the post-war territorial
status quo must be maintained, they are arguing for a con-
tinuation of their opportunistic policy of military expansion,
an expansion they accept as totally legitimate.
3 . Pandora's Box
A problem transcending the Northern Territories issue
is that of the territorial claims levied against the Russians
by other nation-states and ethnic minorities within the Soviet
Union. For the Soviets to compromise on the Northern Terri-
tories dispute would be to open themselves to claims by East-
ern Europeans, the Chinese, the Finns, and their own ethnic
minorities (Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Kazaks, Uzbeks,
etc. ) .
Many of the statements by Soviet officials voicing an
unrelenting stance in refusing to discuss any territorial
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problem with the Japanese have been intended for other ears
(notably Chinese) in an effort to demonstrate the futility
of making revanchist claims against the Soviet Union. In
stating "the Soviet Union has no intention of transferring
to Japan a single piece of stone, let alone an island," the
Soviet ambassador to Japan, Dimitrii Polyansky, was continuing
the rhetorical notification to all concerned that prospects
of the USSR returning anyone's claimed lands are bleak and
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can in no case be decided anywhere other than in the Kremlin.
As concerns the Northern Territories, the Russians
view the Japanese claims as being wholly unrealistic. Where-
as German Chancellor Willy Brandt, in closing the book on
territorial claims between the Federal Republic of Germany on
one hand and the Soviet Union and the German Democratic
Republic on the other hand, "sacrificed" 114,000 square kilo-
meters and a population of 9.6 million people, the Japanese
will not forget 5,000 square kilometers and 16,000 homeless
Japanese refugees. The Soviet actions in Europe and Asia
after World War II followed the established procedures for
victors in war; Japan's attempt to rewrite the understood
rules cannot be allowed. And in order to reduce the potential
problems of territorial claims, both active and dormant, the
Soviets have taken the course of action of simply refusing to
acknowledge the existence of any territorial claims. As an
Isvestia commentator recently stated:
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The Soviet principled stand is that any attempt to
change territorial status since the end of World War II
would be categorically rejected. We have spent thirty
years making Europe understand this, and we cannot main-
tain such a stand and then negate it. The stand of
maintaining post-World War II political and geographical
boundaries is equally applicable to Asia. ^4
4 . Public Opinion
Though not known as a regime that pays an abnormal
amount of attention to public opinion, the leaders of the
Kremlin are in their own way responsive to public sentiment,
especially when it coincides with state and party objectives.
The Russian people have been led to believe in the historical
record that the Kuriles, including the Northern Territories,
belong to the Soviet Union. The Russian citizen who is cogni-
zant of the dispute has been brought up to believe that in no
sense can the Northern Territories be regarded as age-old
55Japanese lands. Broadcasts, school curriculum, museum
exhibits, and libraries in the Soviet Far East enhance the
patriotic attachment to the islands. Any attempt to return
the Northern Territories to the Japanese would cause the
Soviet leadership to contend with the sentiments of a populace
that suffered 20 million deaths during the Great Patriotic
War, a public that would loathe the returning of anything to
the "untrustworthy" Japanese.
Another consideration for change in the status quo
would be the disposition of the current Kurile Island
residents. Many of the inhabitants are veterans of the 1945
Kurile campaign. They and their descendants have repeatedly
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been guaranteed their domicile on the islands as a reward for
their sacrifices. A final consideration would be the posi-
tion taken by the Soviet military leadership to any territorial
change. Given the strategic value of the southern Kuriles,
they would certainly be against the reversion of the islands
to the Japanese. This was clearly alluded to in a 20 January
1960 Pravda article by the Soviet Far Eastern Military District
commander when he said that the Soviet people would find it
difficult to understand why the Northern Territories should be
handed over to Japan, a statement intended as much for the
Kremlin civilian leaders as for the Japanese.
As part of the Russian preoccupation with maintenance
of its security through expanding buffer areas, as an opening
wedge for other territorial claims, and as a subject for
public scrutiny, the Northern Territories issue would appear
from the Soviet perspective to be forever settled. Innumerable
Soviet officials have so stated. The Soviet ambassador to
Japan has repeatedly stated to all Japanese who would listen
that the USSR would never consent to any change in its borders
and that it has no intention of changing the post-war reality.
And yet, in the past the Soviet Union has made territorial
concessions in the interests of good relations with other
nations. In returning the Soviet zone in Austria, the
Porkkala naval base in Finland, and Port Arthur and Dairen in
China, the Russians have shown that where political expedience
5 8
and influence are to be gained, positions can change.
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However, the more prevalent Soviet attitude has been a
refusal to even consider such a course of action. A final
reflection on the territorial dimension of the Northern Ter-
ritories dispute is the Soviet belief that time is on their
side. The longer the status quo is maintained, the greater
the conclusiveness of Soviet ownership. Soviet leaders pro-
fess to believe that the day will come when Japan will be
resigned to the present situation.
B. INTRINSIC INTERESTS IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
The Northern Territories do have their own intrinsic
value for the Soviets. Fishing resources, mineral extractions,
military uses, weather stations, and even tourism are some of
the inherent benefits realized by possession of the four island
group. By asserting ownership over the islands and the
accompanying territorial waters, the Russians have, in no
small measure, extended their economic and strategic assets.
1 . Economic Benefits
Maritime resource industries are the most important
part of the Northern Territories economic contributions to
the USSR. The waters adjacent to the southern Kuriles account
59for fully one-thira of all Russian fishing catches. The
Soviet Union is the second largest fish-consuming nation in
the world (Japan is number one). Herring, cod, salmon, crab,
and whales are the most abundant types found in the confluence
of the cold Okhotsk and warm Pacific waters. Iturup, with
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what is believed to be the largest salmon hatchery in the
world, produces more red caviar than any other spot in the
USSR. Shikotan is the main base for the Russian Pacific
whaling fleet with two whale processing plants on Iturup.
Shikotan is also the Soviet home base for its Pacific crab
industry with approximately 1.6 million tins being canned
annually from its three modern canneries. Akar-feltia (a
form of red algae) is also harvested from Kurile waters and
used as a nutrient medium and emulsifier in food, textiles,
paper, tanning, and pharmaceutical products. Kelp is
gathered in the waters of the Northern Territories and is used
as a glue substitute in textile manufacturing. With the
global epidemic of the imposition of the 200-mile maritime
economic zones by most nations, the waters around the south-
ern Kuriles take on even greater significance.
It is also interesting to note that the maritime
industries around the Northern Territories provide employment
for approximately 15,000 seasonal workers, many of them
students from the western regions of the Soviet Union.
Additionally, the Soviets collect sizeable revenues from
Japanese fishermen in the form of licensing and tonnage
taxes; for example, in 1980 the Russians collected $17.4
million just for Japanese catches of salmon and sea trout in
ft
"^
the waters surrounding the Northern Territories
.
Minerals are extracted from the Northern Territories
for various uses throughout the Soviet Union. Bauxite,
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zircanium, gold, zinc, mercury, tin, tungsten, lead, and
copper exist on the islands but are, in many cases, unexploited
due to inaccessibility and neglect. Sulfur deposits on
Kunashir and Iturup are mined and shipped to Sakhalin to be
used in cellulose production. Pumice and perlite are ex-
tracted for use in construction materials and road-building.
Titanium-magnetic sands are dredged from offshore Iturup for
utilization in the aircraft, shipbuilding, and chemical
64industries situated in the Amur River valley.
Though not nearly as developed as the maritime or
mineral resources of the Northern Territories, agriculture
and animal husbandry have been steadily developing. The
normal crops grown in many parts of the Soviet Union (cabbage,
turnips, radishes, carrots, beans, tobacco, etc.) are present
as are the more exotic types (watermelons and tomatoes) due
to the relatively warm climatic conditions. Pigs, sheep,
and horses populate most all settlements, and dairy collec-
tives have been established.
The severe swings in climatic change and geological
instability of the Northern Territories may prove to be a
blessing in disguise. The volcanism and cold water within
close proximity of each other provide an ideal opportunity
for the utilization of geothermal power. Previously, the
Japanese residents of the islands used Kunashir' s "hot
beaches" for heating their homes and food. Now the Soviets




produces the majority of electrical power for the island.
As fossil fuels and other forms of energy become more costly,
the geothermal resources of the Northern Territories will
continue to provide cheap, inexhaustible energy for the
future
.
By the 1960's the Soviets had discovered that the
Northern Territories were an excellent location for vacation
retreats from the harsh realities of Siberia and the Soviet
Far East. Kunashir attracts the greatest amount of tourists,
limited only to Soviet citizens. Its exotic plant life
(bamboo, magnolia, etc.) and sulphurous baths on the "hot
beaches" attract thousands of visitors each year. A health
resort, sanatorium, and other facilities on Kunashir produces
a long waiting list of hopefuls. And although the Japanese
picture the Kuriles as remote northern lands, Kunashir has
been called the "Kurile Crimea."
2 . Strategic Benefits
Mention should be made of the strategic importance of
the four island group of the Northern Territories as opposed
to the whole archipelago. The southern four contain the two
largest islands in the chain (Iturup and Kunashir) and ac-
count for roughly one-half of the land area of the entire
island chain. The naval, air, ground, and intelligence
missions of the Soviet forces in the Kuriles vis-a-vis Japan
is best performed from these outposts. The natural harbors
in Kunashir (Tomari Bay and Furukamappu) , Iturup (Shana,
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Skamanbe, Mayoro , and Hitokappu) and Shikotan (Anama,
Shakotan, and Matsugahama) are among the best in the Kuriles.
The air and ground missions are undoubtably enhanced by their
proximity to the Japanese homeland, as are the reconnaissance
and intelligence-gathering efforts. Additionally, the Kunashir
Channel (separating Kunashir and Iturup) is the primary water-
way used by the Soviets when sailing between the Pacific Ocean
and the Sea of Okhotsk. So the guts of the Soviet military
presence in the Kuriles is situated in the Northern Territories.
Curiously enough, the Habomais island group has not been the
object of any military buildup. It has evidently been deemed
unsuitable for military airfields, has no natural harbors, and
is too small for any sizeable troop concentrations.
Weather stations are also present in the Northern
Territories, as is a considerable KGB operation on Kunashir.
The KGB, while involved in the more mundane intelligence work
of gathering and deciphering the latest Japanese print material,
also make a considerable effort to gain intelligence from
Japanese fishermen in the area. In exchange for the right to
fish in usually restricted waters, the Japanese provide the
KGB shore patrols with information concerning prominent
Hokkaido residents (the local police chief, Self Defense Force
officials, and leaders of the Northern Territories campaign
groups) and movements of the Japanese Self Defense Force
elements. Japanese fishermen apprehended while poaching
in Soviet-controlled waters are particularly inviting targets
for this type of activity.
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C . TARGET : JAPAN
Other than the economic and strategic benefits derived by
the Soviets in possessing the southern Kuriles, the Russians
have used the Northern Territories problem to influence, pres-
sure, cajole, and even extort the Japanese into situations
more advantageous to Soviet power primacy in East Asia. Many
strategic analysts believe that the Soviets own most of the
trump cards in the Japanese-Soviet relationship: links with
the Japanese Communist Party, natural resources and markets
desired by the Japanese, the military muscle to back up their
actions, and without the weight of adhering to diplomatic
niceties. And thus the Northern Territories issue is a
reflection of the supremacy of the Soviet position. Other
observers consider the Russians' dealings with Japan, espe-
cially as it pertains to the Northern Territories, as being
a classic example of Soviet diplomatic ineptitude. Whatever
the verdict, the territorial problem, while presenting a
continuing conundrum, provides the Soviets with a certain
amount of leverage over the Japanese.
1 . Historical Distrust
Though many Japanese may regard their country as
vulnerable, incapable of belligerent acts, and militarily
impotent, the Soviets do not share that view. Historical
relations between the two had been fairly good up until the
end of the 19th century; territorial problems were peace-
fully settled in the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and the Treaty
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of St. Petersburg (1875) . But trouble began in 1891 with
the initiation of construction of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
road; completed in 1903, the railroad signalled the intent
of Russia to become a power in a region that the Japanese
considered to be in their vital interest. The last decade
of the 19th century and the first of the 20th century wit-
nessed the Russian concoction of the Triple Intervention in
the Liaotung Peninsula controversy of 1895, Russian attempts
to solidify their position in Korea, and ultimately the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-1905. The Japanese participation in
the Allied intervention in Siberia (1918-1922) , the Japanese
Manchurian expansion (1931) , and the Japanese-Soviet border
clashes in Manchuria (1938-1939) were all further manifesta-
tions of the bilateral animosities.
The Soviet declaration of war on Japan and seizure
of the Kurile Islands in 1945 (despite the existence of a
Neutrality Pact still in force) , the forced labor and deaths
of Japanese prisoners of war, and Soviet attempts to extend
their influence within post-war Japan have cemented the dis-
trust the Japanese have for the Russians and vice versa.
Technically, the Soviet Union and Japan are still in a state
of war. No peace treaty ending the Second World War between
the USSR and Japan has been signed. In 1956 they did sign a
Joint Declaration of Peace to terminate hostilities, settle
fi 7
war reparations, and establish diplomatic relations. The
consummation of a peace treaty has been delayed by the
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Japanese demand for the return of the Northern Territories
as a prerequisite for peace treaty negotiations and the Soviet
refusal to discuss the issue.
More recently, the sanctification of the US-Japan
Defense Treaty, increased Japanese military expenditures,
the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, and the rejec-
tion of Brezhnev's proposed Asian Collective Security Plan
are graphic examples of what the Russian leaders see as the
potential for a Japanese return to a policy of militaristic
expansionism.
As part of this distrust of Japanese intentions, the
Soviets are not convinced that even if some degree of conces-
sions are given in the Northern Territories the Japanese will
not press for the broader demands for the remainder of the
Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin Island. In that
respect, it may be better from the Soviet perspective to
consolidate their hold on the islands and wait out the
Japanese
.
The Soviets also cite the Northern Territories rever-
sion demonstrations and campaigns as manifestations of the
confrontational nature of the Japanese "anti-Soviet ruling
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clique." They are convinced that without substantial change
in the attitudes of the Japanese leaders and the continued
strategic alignment of the Japanese in an anti-Soviet block
with the United States and China, there is no incentive or




The Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territo-
ries and the heavy-handed nature in dealing with the Japanese
desires to discuss the issue highlight the relative helpless-
ness that Japan experiences in trying to deal with the
Russians. The Soviets continually emphasize the inferior
position of the Japanese in the southern Kurile question and
in their relationship as a whole.
As recently as the early 1970' s there appeared to be
strong possibilities for solving the territorial problem. In
January 1972 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko arrived
in Tokyo with the offer of a possible compromise. The spec-
ulation was that Gromyko offered the return of Shikotan and
the Habomais in exchange for the renunciation of any claims
to Kunashir and Iturup, Japanese promises of economic develop-
ment in Siberia, and Japanese adherence to the Brezhnev pro-
posal (1969) for an Asian collective security pact (an
instrument designed to diplomatically and politically isolate
the Chinese). But because of Nixon's impending visit to
the PRC and all that implied for Sino-Japanese relations and
the political impossibility of Prime Minister Sato dealing
away the two big islands, the offer was rebuffed.
Subsequent to Gromyko ' s trip, world events seemed to
turn in Moscow's favor. The SALT I Treaty (1972), U.S. forces
withdrawn from Vietnam (1973), and the Arab petroleum embargo
of the western nations were all landmark events that augured
54

for increased Soviet global influence. With the oil embargo
came new Soviet perceptions of Japan's strength. Japan had
represented a strong economic giant, able to supply the
Russians with technology, capital, and advanced industrial
techniques necessary to develop Soviet resources, a nation
to be handled with considerable care. But the energy crisis
graphically demonstrated to the Soviets the vulnerable nature
of the Japanese economy - an insular nation dependent on out-
side resources and markets.
The Soviets also believe that relations with Japan
should develop at the pace dictated by the Kremlin and that
Japan should have to make the adjustments, not themselves.
Japan currently presents no security threat to the Soviet
Union. Additionally, it is .felt that Japan, in aligning
itself with the Western economies, will suffer the same
recession and depression cycles "inherent" in a capitalist
system and that the Japanese people will, out of necessity,
72demand closer relations with the USSR.
Japan's vulnerability to the armed strength of the
Soviet Union is also frequently emphasized by the Soviet
rhetoric. The military build-up in the Northern Territo-
ries is an excellent example. In a rather indiscreet dis-
closure, a Russian diplomat laughingly boasted to a Japanese
newsman that a Soviet invasion of Japan "would take only
73
several tens of minutes if we did it in real earnest."
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials have noted that Russian
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military exercises in and around the southern Kuriles are
rehearsals for the type of activity that would be taken
74during an invasion of Japan. Verbal threats are sometimes
more direct, as illustrated by a Soviet general's recent
remark that any attempt by Japan to settle the territorial
issue by force "would naturally lead to war, which would be
unnecessary and dangerous to Japan c"
The Northern Territories issue also allows the Soviet
Union the opportunity to influence Japanese public opinion
concerning Japanese-Soviet relations. A Radio Moscow broad-
cast (22 January 1981), as an indicator of Soviet sentiments,
stated that the anti-Soviet nature of the Northern Territo-
ries campaigns and demonstrations have been perpetrated by
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) , the conservative ruling
7 6party in Japan, as an instrument of neo-militarism. This
neo-militarism is cited by the Russians as being of the same.
type that caused the Pacific War and, if pursued by the
Japanese, will have the same results. A recent Izvestia
article related that the revanchist campaigns have:
.... gained nothing on this path in the past and
will not cover itself with laurels in the future un-
less the initiators of this malicious campaign calm
down. Putting an end to it is in Japan's own
interests. 77




Japan is now faced with many difficult and real
problems requiring attention both within the country
and in the foreign sphere. It is also a fact that
many ordinary Japanese weighing-up these problems
unhesitatingly oppose attempts to fan an unseemly
propaganda campaign around the so-called "territorial
issue" while the Japanese peoples' real needs and
interests are relegated to the background and con-
signed to oblivion. 7°
Russian reminders also highlight the delicate nature of the
Japanese economy. As the Soviets are quick to observe, Japan's
economy, which is dependent on foreign trade, necessitates
the development of peaceful trade and economic cooperation
with its neighbors and "cannot afford to slide back onto
79
the path of confrontation and defeat."
Soviet leaders also point to the unrealistic nature
of the Japanese claims. The West Germans abandoned their
revanchist claims after realization of the Soviet power and
desire to retain the status quo of the post-war world. The
Russians are incredulous at the continual harping of the
Japanese about a small group of islands that were lost over
thirty-six years ago; but the Soviets are comforted by the
fact that the Japanese are helpless to force any changes,
3 . Linkages
The Soviets had hoped that the territorial problem
with Japan would have faded away after a sufficient amount
of time had elapsed and the Japanese were able to swallow
their pride and accept the de facto situation. But to the
contrary, recent public and media attention and government
support for the islands' return has become even stronger.
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The Russians, in turn, have attempted to utilize the North-
ern Territories problem to exact economic and political
benefits while preventing the Japanese from doing the same.
The Soviets preach that linking the territorial issue with
other areas is dangerous for Japanese-Soviet relations, but
they use the same linkage strategy themselves when gains are
to be made. Former Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin made that
clear, as have others, when he said that continued revanchist
8Japanese claims "will no doubt affect other problems."
Faced with Tokyo's adamant stance, Russian leaders
have offered to improve economic, scientific, cultural, and
diplomatic ties with Japan in the hope that strong ties
(especially economic) between the two will help remove what
time has not. In fact, the current hopes of the Soviet
leadership for closer relations with the Japanese are almost
entirely focused on economic enticements, giving Japan a
stronger incentive to move toward a more balanced position
in its global alignment. The Soviet perception of the Japan-
ese economy being dependent on international trade is
coupled with the notion that the future will bring greater
trade frictions with the United States and Western Europe,
all of which will lead the Japanese to seek the raw materials,
markets, and investment opportunity that the Soviet Union
possesses. One need only recall the Gromyko offer of 1972
as an example of Soviet attempts to transfer these percep-
tions into political leverage over Japan. As concerns the
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Northern Territories, the Russians warn Japanese officials
that "linking of Siberian development and the so-called
8
1
'territorial issue' hurts Japan-USSR relations." Then when
it serves their purposes, "The first casualties of a policy
hostile to the Soviet Union, the so-called 'territorial
issue', could be cultural, scientific, and technical links,
mutual relations in the sphere, and trade and economic
8 2
cooperation." In other words, linkage is acceptable if it
is made by the Kremlin.
Fishing is an area that has witnessed a linkage with
the Northern Territories issue. With Japan's defeat in
World War II, the Japanese lost the right to fish in Russian
waters that it had won as a result of the Russo-Japanese War.
And Japan also lost the very rich waters around the Northern
Territories. As the world's greatest fish-consuming nation,
this was a disasterous blow to the industry. The lack of
adequate fishing resources in the Northeast Asia region for
feeding their people has led to the establishment of sophis-
ticated Japanese and Soviet fishing fleets that reach out to
global fishing grounds, but the problems in the Northeast
Asia region remained. Because of contrived arguments, seiz-
ure of Japanese fishing boats by Soviet patrol craft, and a
general deterioration between the two nations, there was a
realization that an agreement concerning the fishing problem
would be necessary. On 27 May 1977, after much negotiating,
the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Agreement was signed. The
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Japanese were compelled to accept catch limits, operating
licenses, on-board inspections, and other regulations as the
price for fishing in Russian zones. As it stands now, Japan-
ese-Soviet delegations each year establish annual limits that
each nation's fishermen may take from the others waters.
The fishing accords have become an extension of the Northern
Territories dispute; they have been used by both sides to
substantiate their claims to the southern Kuriles. Moscow
has been afraid that if concessions for fishing rights are
given around the Kuriles it will strengthen Japanese irreden-
tist claims. Conversely, the Japanese have been reluctant
to pay fees for the use of the waters for fear of cementing
the de facto situation. Since the advent of the 200-mile
offshore economic zones some four years ago, the fishing
areas around the Kuriles have become more important. The
Soviets contend that the only result of the Japanese territo-
rial claims has been "trouble" in settling the more important
fishing issues and that they are all fundamentally part of
the overall relationship. As reported in Sovetskaya Rossiya :
The Japanese side frequently resorts to the thesis
that politics is politics and fishing is fishing. It
supports development of ties with the USSR in this
sphere and the further stabilization and switch-over
to a long-term footing. However, can this aspect be
separated from the overall system of Soviet-Japanese
relations? 83
Other threats are less subtle. On 11 September 1976
the former Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa made a long-
range "inspection" of the Northern Territories aboard a
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Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat as a prelude to talks he
was to hold with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. After the
inspection cruise (which was no closer than three kilometers
to the nearest Habomai island) Miyazawa met with a group of
local fishermen who presented him with a petititon calling
for the islands' return and safety from Soviet seizure of their
fishing boats. On 12 September the Russians, in obvious
retaliation for the inspection tour, seized three Japanese
fishing vessels, impounded the boats, and charged the crews
with espionage against the Soviet Union.
The Russians also charge that a double standard is
being applied by the Japanese in their dealings with the
Soviet Union. The professed Japanese foreign policy of
seikei bunri (the separation of politics and economics) is
84
applied, say the Soviets, to all countries except the USSR.
Although the Soviet Union is not the only country where Japan
has modified its seikei bunri policy, Moscow argues that it
is an anti-Soviet ultramilitaristic group in Japan that is
using the Northern Territories issue to prevent good Japanese-
Soviet relations by linking the dispute to economic, cultural,
3 5
and diplomatic dealings. The Soviets assert that this
"double standard" has been especially detrimental to the
conclusion of a peace treaty.
Despite Russian claims of being an Asian power based
on geography, history, and superpower status, the USSR is
still regarded by most Asians as being outsiders and highly
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suspect. But the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace
treaty would lend increased legitimacy to Moscow's eastern
activities. Ideally the Soviets want the peace treaty to
legalize the territorial status quo in East Asia so as to
dispense not only with the Northern Territories problem, but
also to significantly weaken Chinese claims. As a stop-
gap measure, the Russians proposed in February 1978 (facing
the increased prospects of a Sino-Japanese treaty) a "Treaty
of Friendship and Good Neighborliness . " It was proposed
when a draft of the Soviet offer was published in Izvestia.
The Kremlin's unilateral publication of the draft treaty
highly offended the Japanese officials, and it drew criticisms
such as "discourteous" and "insulting" for two reasons:
Moscow had not consulted with any Japanese of ficials prior to
the draft's publication, and the treaty made no mention of
87
the territorial issue. The Japanese were further incensed
by the revelation that certain clauses in the treaty were
included in Soviet treaties it had with its "satellite"
states in Eastern Europe. The proposed treaty was summarily
rejected amid Japanese media accusations that the Soviets
were trying to "Finlandize" Japan.
The Soviets have also utilized the practice of
Japanese visiting their family graves on the southern Kuriles
in attempting to influence Japanese political behavior.
Since 1946 the Russians had allowed the annual visitation of
ancestoral graves only if family members could produce a valid
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Japanese passport and obtain an entry visa from the Soviet
embassy (no small task) . In May 1964 a visiting Vice-Premier
Mikoyan gave, as a "gift", to Japanese family members, the
right to enter Shikotan and the Habomais for grave visitation
purposes needing only an identification card issued by the
Japanese government (the same requirement that was needed to
8 8
enter U.S. -run Okinawa). Japanese criticism of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 resulted in an immediate
suspension of all grave visitations in the Northern Territories
Though the suspensions were temporary, they soon developed
into a familiar pattern of retaliation by the Russians
against "harmful" Japanese behavior. Visit suspensions were
also enforced in 1971 and 1972. The 1971 event was a result
of Prime Minister Sato's presentation of the territorial
issue before the United Nations General Assembly; the 1972
suspension was a reaction to the opening of formal relations
between Tokyo and Peking. On 3 September 1976 the Japanese
embassy in Moscow was informed that identification cards
alone would not be acceptable for visits to Shikotan or the
Habomais; the Soviets decided again to require both Japanese
passports and Soviet visas. The new terms, called "entirely
unjustifiable" by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, were seen
to be part of a more deliberate Soviet program to tighten
their grip on the Northern Territories in light of Tokyo's
refusal to give any support to Gromyko ' s peace treaty
proposal or the Asian collective security plan and as a
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demonstration of displeasure for the impending "inspection"
8 9
of the islands by Foreign Minister Miyazawa.
4 . Politics and Public Opinion
The Soviets argue that the alleged territorial issue
90
has become a "stale" subject. They contend, however, that
Japan has real and definite reasons for continuing the char-
ade in the southern Kuriles. The motive is to present the
Russians as a threat to Japanese security; in this manner
anti-Soviet propoganda can be whipped-up to substantiate
tremendous boosts in military spending by the "ultra-
91
nationalist" rulers of Japan. Japan will then (with U.S.
approval) become a strong regional power, threatening the
security of the rest of Asia, ruining its economy, and finally
resulting in the same disaster it experienced in the Pacific
War.
The Russians also present many of their Japanese
language Radio Moscow broadcasts concerning the "so-called
territorial issue" with the Japanese public in mind. They
emphasize that the territorial issue has been settled for a
long time, that the Japanese public understands this and
accepts the Soviet position, and that it is only the unrealis-
tic, militaristic nature of the pro-U.S. Japanese officials
that are using the Northern Territories dispute for their own
.
• 92political advantage. The Russians contend that the Japan-
ese public has long given up any territorial claims over the
southern Kuriles and that the Japanese government and the LDP
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are using the problem to attract more "disoriented" people to
93
their fold. The Soviets emphasize that the people of
Hokkaido would be positively effected by greater trade with
the Soviet Union if only the government would cease its
groundless demands for the return of the islands that the
94
Hokkaido residents realize will never be returned to Japan.
The preoccupation of Japanese officials with the Northern
Territories, the Russians say, has caused them to neglect the
real needs and problems of the people.
The Soviets assert that the presentation of the
Northern Territories in the nation-wide school curriculum,
designation of a "Northern Territories Day", and "inspections"
of the islands by government officials all comprise an in-
tentional government program to destroy the possibility of
close Japanese-Soviet relations. In fact, they say that the
Northern Territories Day should more correctly be called
95Anti-Soviet Day. The Northern Territories campaigns have
also been called an "open encroachment on the sovereignty and
9 fiterritorial integrity of the Soviet Union."
The Russians have also taken to using the ploy of
inviting various Japanese politicians to the Soviet Union to
discuss particular problems between the two countries. They
use the forum to reiterate their belief that no territorial
problem exists, wine and dine the politicians, and then send
them home with the hope that their "revelation of realizations"
will sift back and influence the Japanese.
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Hokkaido's 5,5 million Japanese have been the special
target of a Russian campaign to weaken that population's sup-
97
port for the return of the Northern Territories. The
campaign has two purposes - persuade the Hokkaido Japanese
that the Northern Territories will never be returned, and
destroy the "myth" of a Soviet threat to Japan. The Russians
figure that if the Hokkaido residents can be convinced that
the disputed territories are gone forever and the Soviets
present no threat to them, Tokyo will lose much of the power
of its assertion that the Japanese people, and not the govern-
ment, demand the return of the southern Kuriles. The
campaign's specific efforts have taken, according to a DIA
report, the following form:
(1) A number of Soviet-Japanese "friendship halls" have
been erected in Hokkaido. Their construction and activities
are being supported, in large measure, by the contributions
of Japanese businesses, especially fishing, that have a stake
in cultivating the good will of the Russians.
(2) Several Japanese-Soviet associations have become
active in Hokkaido. These are staffed and controlled by pro-
Soviet Japanese and actively supported by Japanese business-
men who have an interest in trade with the Russians.
(3) Some fishing communities, with the assistance of the
friendship halls, have taken steps to distance themselves
from the Northern Territories campaigns and demonstrations.
Their non-support for the government-sponsored efforts are
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intended to ingratiate themselves with the Soviets and hope-
fully obtain favorable fishing conditions.
The Soviets have used every opportunity and means
available to try to convince the Japanese that the territo-
rial matter is settled and that continued revanchist claims
have the singular effect of damaging Japanese-Soviet relations.
And in any case, say the Soviets, Japan is helpless to change
the current situation.
D. TARGET: THE JAPANESE-CHINESE-AMERICAN ENTENTE
Without question the two priority goals of Soviet policy
in Asia have been to reduce American power and influence in
the region and to contain the People's Republic of China.
Japan's role for Soviet accomplishment of these objectives has,
until the last ten' years, been almost totally neglected. But
since the normalization of relations between the PRC, the
United States, and Japan, the Soviet Union has witnessed a
disturbing tide of economic, political, and military coopera-
tion that appears to the Kremlin as a growing anti-Soviet
security alliance. The territorial problem has been used
intermittently by the Soviets in an attempt to influence the
formation and strength of such an alliance.
1 . Brezhnev's Collective Security Scheme
Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev first enunciated his
collective security plan for Asia in 1969. Over the next ten
years the vague and amorphous scheme has been revised and
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restated until it has evolved into six basic precepts:
(1) peaceful neighborly relations should prevail among sov-
ereign, independent nations as a solution to all problems,
(2) use of force in any situation among states is unjustifi-
able, (3) states should conduct their own internal affairs
without any outside interference, (4) imperialism, in all
forms, must disappear from Asia, (5) current geographical
boundaries should be observed by all nations, and (6) cur-
9 8
rent regional alliances should be dissolved.
The plan is intended to be a nonmilitary association of
states observing the above principles. Reaction to the pro-
posal has been almost entirely negative, and it has been
interpreted by most Asian nations as a carefully conceived
Soviet plan to isolate the PRC, to prevent a response by the
Asian states to Soviet military power, and to obliterate
Japanese and Chinese territorial claims against the USSR.
The biggest problem the Soviets have had in selling the idea
has been the severe credibility gap that has evolved as a





Moscow asserts that since the establishment of rela-
tions among the three powers (1972) , there has been a steadily
growing military alliance that is directed against the USSR.
In the September 1978 edition of Red Star , the Russian mili-
tary newspaper, the S mo-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty
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of 1978 was called "a step towards a joint military bloc of
99
the U.S., China, and Japan." Pravda (8 February 1981)
called the Japanese acceptance of joining the PRC and the U.S.
in a de facto alliance as a decision which "elevates anti-
Sovietism to the rank of state policy." Washington and
Peking's encouragement for increased Japanese defense expendi-
tures, alternating visits of Chinese and Japanese military
contingents to each others' countries, and the U.S. govern-
ment's decision to sell weaponry to the Chinese all appear
to the Soviets (with good cause) as actions aimed directly
at the Soviet Union. In a January 1978 speech, the then
Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda did not quell Soviet fears
when he stated:
Japan's close cooperation with the United States is
the basic pivot of Japanese foreign policy. In this
context, the Japan-China peace treaty is not to be
regarded as a simple bilateral agreement, but rather
as a more advanced form of cooperation with the US.
That is, we consider the treaty as one facet of the
US world strategy. 101
The Russians have retorted to anyone who will listen that
continued anti-Soviet activity by the three powers will
threaten the security of Asia and have the direst of
102
consequences. As will be seen, the Northern Territories
have become political carrots used by the Kremlin leaders to
influence Japanese behavior in this quadrilateral relationship,
hostages to "correct" Japanese behavior.
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3. Japan and the People's Republic of China
Because the People's Republic of China is the major
Soviet preoccupation in Asia, Japan's relationship to the
Soviet Union has to be interpreted by the Russians, to a
large extent, by the political distance maintained between
the Japanese and Chinese. As Japan and China move closer into
more cooperative efforts (which has been the case since 1972)
,
so have Soviet endeavors increased to stop what it sees as
an alliance based on anti-Sovietism. However, Japan, with
its "swing" status between the two great powers, is feared
less by the Russians for its possible contributions to a
military alliance than what the Japanese could do economically
and technologically to help the Chinese achieve their desire
for modernization.
The Northern Territories problem has been a primary
vehicle used by Moscow in an attempt to prevent closer Sino-
Japanese ties. As Japanese rapproachment with China became
a reality in 1972, the Soviets had to readjust their policy
toward Japan. A January 197 2 Gromyko mission to Tokyo failed
to prevent the joint recognition of China and Japan and
failed to make any headway in convincing the Japanese to
accept the terms of a peace treaty proposal. The Russians
suggested a summit meeting in Moscow between Brezhnev and
the new Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to discuss overall
relations. The two-day conference took place in October 1973
with the Russians pushing for Japanese participation in their
70

collective security plan; in turn, the territorial issue
seemed to be open for negotiation. One official of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union stated during the conference,
"Asian security should come first. The territorial question
is a minor question that can be settled if a peaceful co-
103
existence structure in Asia is firmly established." After
the conference, other Soviet officials dropped other con-
spicuous hints that the Northern Territories problem was
negotiable. A Japanese Communist Party delegate to Moscow
later in 197 3 gained agreement with his Soviet counterparts
that a peace treaty should be signed with the Habomais and
Shikotan returned immediately to Japan and the .status of the
104
two larger islands left for future settlement.
The Soviets could live with Sino-Japanese cross-
recognition, but as further cooperation, economic treaties,
and diplomatic warmth increased, Moscow's position in the
Northern Territories hardened considerably. Despite half-
hearted efforts by the Japanese to instigate peace treaty
discussions, after the 1973 summit conference the Russians
expressed little interest in renewing negotiations. From
1972 to 1976 no senior Soviet official visited Japan (no
top-ranking Soviet leader, including Brezhnev and Kosygin,
105has ever visited Japan) . Even though the Russians have
indicated that the territorial issue was settled and would
never be discussed, the situation was soon to change.
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At the time that Japan and the PRC established
diplomatic relations in 1972, the Chinese leaders still
regarded the two nations as being in a legal state of war,
even though Japan and the Nationalist Chinese concluded a
peace treaty in 1952. Chinese and Japanese leaders had both
expressed a desire during the formal talks to establish dip-
lomatic relations to proceed to negotiate a "treaty of peace
and friendship." As deliberations for such a treaty began
in 1974, the Chinese insisted on the inclusion of a clause
stating that the countries were opposed to other countries
seeking "hegemony" in Asia. The Japanese were reluctant to
include the anti-hegemony clause because of its obvious
reference to the Soviet Union and Tokyo's desire not to anger
the Russians; when negotiations bogged down over acceptance of
the clause, the disagreement became public. The Russians
held up the anti-hegemony clause as evidence of Peking's
design to make Asia a Chinese playground. Japan was thus
directly involved in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
Moscow's reluctance to discuss the Northern Territo-
ries after the 1973 summit conference caused Japan, in late
1975, to reconsider its opposition to the anti-hegemony
clause. This quickly brought Foreign Minister Gromyko to
Tokyo in January 19 76 with an offer to exchange the two
smaller islands for a solid promise that Japan would not sign
a treaty with the Chinese that contained an anti-hegemony
10 6
clause. The Japanese reacted with indignation over what
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they declared was a Sino-Japanese bilateral matter. They
refused the offer and announced that treaty negotiations
with the Chinese would proceed. On 13 January 1976, Prime
Minister Miki declared that there would not be a peace treaty
between Japan and the USSR until all of the Northern Territo-
ries had been returned to Japan.
For two long years Sino-Japanese treaty talks dragged
on. Then on 10 January 1978 Soviet Premier Kosygin told
visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda that "the Soviet
Union does not recognize the existence of a territorial prob-
10 8lem in its relations with Japan." Sonoda refused to sign
the joint communique of the meeting and rebuffed a new peace
treaty proposal by Gromyko because it made no mention of the
territorial issue. When Sonoda returned to Japan, the Japan-
ese government accused Moscow of "unilaterally negating" the
1973 summit conference groundwork that (from the Japanese
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viewpoint) laid basis to Japanese territorial claims.
As it became apparent that a Sino-Japanese treaty
would be signed in 1978, the Soviet began to apply pressure
in their own inimitable way to prevent its conclusion. The
Soviets threatened to "revise" their relations with the
Japanese if a treaty was signed and indicated that an anti-
Soviet treaty would necessitate that the USSR take "defensive
countermeasures" against Japan. The ultimate intimidation
came in May and June when the Russians held extensive mili-
tary maneuvers in the Northern Territories; ground troops
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were stationed on the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the
first since 1960. Live-fire amphibious exercises occurred
in July off the two large islands, and increased Soviet naval
traffic appeared in all three of the strategic straits leaving
the Sea of Japan. Soviet military officials, for their part,
steadfastly maintained that the military forces on the islands
were there to protect against a Chinese attack and are not in
any manner directed against Japan.
The rhetorical and physical intimidation was counter-
productive. A Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT)
was signed on 12 August 1978 in Peking. The treaty declared
that neither China nor Japan would seek hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific region and would oppose efforts by other countries
to do so. Japanese insistence saw the inclusion of two clauses
(1) the agreement would not affect any existing relations with
any third countries (protecting the U.S. -Japan security pact),
and (2) in an effort to partially pacify the Soviets, the anti-
hegemony clause was stated as not being directed against any
112particular country.
Soviet intransigence on the territorial issue and
undisguised military intimidation of Japan during the final
stages of the PFT talks seemed to enhance what they were
designed to prevent. By signing the treaty, promulgating
extensive economic cooperation agreements, and increasing
cultural, political, and military exchange programs with the
Chinese, the Japanese have consciously modified their
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professed "equidistance" policy between Moscow and Peking.
The result, as evidenced by the territorial issue, has been
an upward-spiraling circle of intimidation and the elimina-
tion of reason from Japanese-Soviet relations. Premier
113Kosygin called the PFT an "historic mistake." The Soviet
press has labeled it a "vicious anti-Soviet device" and a
114
"dangerous factor for increasing the tension in Asia.
"
Since 19 78 the Soviets have repeatedly demanded that the
Japanese sign a treaty of good neighbor liness and cooperation
with them as a balance to the Chinese treaty and as proof of
Japan's intentions to maintain good Japanese-Soviet
relations." The Japanese have refused, denying that they
have anything to make amends for and point out that Soviet
refusal to even discuss the territorial issue is the real
impediment to such a pact.
Moscow has also cited Tokyo's double standard in
dealing with the territorial issues involving the Soviet Union
and China. Both China and Japan claim the Senkaku Islands,
a tiny group of islets lying north of Taiwan and south of the
Ryukyus. In 1972 after formal diplomatic relations were estab-
lished, both Peking and Tokyo agreed to shelve the territorial
dispute and hold it for future discussions. Again in 1978,
when the PFT was concluded, the dispute was conveniently
avoided by both parties and agreement was made to resolve the
issue at some unspecified date. The Soviets maintain that
that is the same formula that they have always proposed for
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settling the Northern Territories problem and the consumma-
tion of a peace treaty. Moscow has thus pointed to this
double standard in dealing with territorial issues as further
evidence of Tokyo's tilted policy toward China.
The PRC, of course, has its own territorial claims
against the Soviet Union, which is another incentive for the
Russians to gain Japanese acquiescence to the status quo .
If Moscow can cause the Japanese to abandon their claims to
the Northern Territories, China will be the only country in
Asia with revanchist claims against the USSR, thereby reduc-
ing the strength of the Chinese position. Because of the
Chinese claims and the border clashes of 1969, many of the
harsh statements from Moscow denying Japanese territorial
appeals have been intended for Chinese as well as Japanese
ears
.
4 . Japan and the United States
Although the primary focus of Moscow's relations with
Japan has been the containment of China, the Soviets have also
aimed toward reducing the American influence and presence in
Asia. Brezhnev's collective security scheme was an attempt,
in part, to reduce U.S. influence with the Japanese as the
plan called for the end of all current security relationships
and treaties. The territorial issue has been used as a ful-
crum for attempting to pry Japan away from the Americans.
The Russian media, not surprisingly, has maintained that the
territorial issue was invented in Washington by former
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and owes its genesis
to the Cold War. Now, say the Russians, the Chinese have
become the American proxies in pushing the Japanese to press
.. . , . 118for territorial concessions.
Moscow's reason for reneging on their promise in the 1956
Joint Peace Declaration (to return Shikotan and the Habomais
immediately upon consummation of a peace treaty) is that the
situation in Asia has changed considerably over the years.
Their interpretation is that East Asia is significantly more
anti-Soviet (thanks to Chinese and American influence) than
119it was in 1956. It is to be noted that the Soviets first
revised the conditions for the reversion of Shikotan and the
Habomais on 27 January I960, only days after the Japanese
government approved a revised security treaty with the United
States. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced then that the
entire Northern Territories would be retained by the USSR
until all foreign (American) military forces had completely
120
withdrawn from Japan. Gromyko ' s declaration was inter-
preted in Japan as a blatant Soviet attempt to destroy U.S.-
Japanese security relations and ensure Japan's neutralization
In September 1964, Premier Kruschev told a visiting
delegation of LDP members that the existence of U.S. military
bases and troops in Japan was the sole reason for the delay
121in the return of the "territories claimed by Japan." The
Japanese countered that American troops were in Japan prior
to the 1956 Joint Peace Declaration and no mention of their
removal was ever made.
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Moscow states that as a tool used by the United States
during the Cold War and continuing to the present, the Northern
Territories issue is hurting Japanese-Soviet relations. In
order to restore good relations, the Russians argue that the
Cold War legacy should be jettisoned as an anachronistic dis-
122
service to the Japanese people. The only way to do that is
to drop the issue. And even if the USSR returned all of the
islands, the result, the Soviets contend, would be the sta-
tioning of U.S. forces on the islands, causing regional
123instability and threats to the peace of Japan.
E. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
Beginning in the mid-1970 's there has been a steady and
substantial buildup in the Soviet military presence in the
Northern Territories. Troop levels have increased, equipment
has been upgraded, and overall force capabilities have like-
wise grown. Having achieved many of their force-level goals
in Europe, the Soviets have begun to pay more attention to
building a power base in East Asia. The military activities
in and around the Northern Territories is an example of that
expanding attention.
1. Chronology
After the conclusion of World War II, a Soviet corps
of ground troops (one motorized division and one brigade) and
a handful of MIG-17 fighters were stationed on Iturup and
Kunashir. Krushchev's decision to reduce the Soviet armed
forces bv 1.2 million men in 1960 was the reason that the
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ground troops were withdrawn during the summer of that year.
No additional military forces were deployed to the Northern
Territories from 1960 to 1978.
Significant Soviet naval activity picked-up in April
1975 with the Ckean II exercises, part of which involved four
naval task forces deployed around the Japanese home islands.
In July of 1976 Soviet warships, in a demonstrative show of
force, sailed from the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima
Strait past Okinawa while Russian reconnaissance aircraft
flew southwards along both the east and west coasts of Japan.
As the prospects of Japan and the PRC signing a peace
treaty were increased in mid-1978, the Soviets acted with
dispatch. Not since the 1960 redeployment had Soviet ground
forces been stationed in the Northern Territories. During May
and June of 1978 combined air, ground, and naval forces took
125part in maneuvers around Iturup and Kunashir. A Soviet
task force of two Kresta-2 class guided-missile cruisers
accompanied by two destroyers moved from the Guam area to
Kurile waters to take part in the amphibious portion of the
exercises. There they rendezvoused with twelve Antanov-12
troop transports and an unknown number of submarines and
support ships. Subsequently, Russian marines from Vladivostok
and part of the crack 6th Airborne Division from Khabarovsk
conducted combined amphibious/airborne live-fire exercises on
the two large islands. The exercises began on the same day
(14 June 1978) that it was announced that China and Japan had
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agreed to reopen the final stages of the PFT talks. When
the dust had settled, 2,000 ground troops remained on the
islands and new construction was soon begun to house the gar-
risoned soldiers. In July 1978 additional amphibious and
live-fire exercises were staged in the waters around Iturup.
Soon after the formal signing of the Sino-Japanese PFT on
12 August 1978 the troop levels on Kunashir and Iturup had
grown to 4,000.
In January 1979 the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA)
announced that the level of Soviet forces in the Northern
Territories had risen to 5,000 and that extensive work on air-
field runways, port facilities, radar stations, and other
127
military construction was in full progress. Official pro-
tests were lodged by the Japanese embassy in Moscow; they were
rejected by the Russians as interference in internal Soviet
12 8
affairs. Other development in 1979 saw SS-20 missiles
deployed near Khabarovsk; aerial photographs showed even more
extensive construction on runways, barracks, and port facili-
ties in the Northern Territories than had been previously
reported by the JDA. And the arrival of two new ships the
Minsk and the Ivan Rogov , substantially increased the capa-
bilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
In May 1979 the Soviets opened the harbor at Shakotan
Bay on Shikotan and stationed a brigade-size force of ground
troops on the island, the first Soviet soldiers ever garrisoned
129
on Shikotan. On 26 September 1979 the JDA announced that
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the Soviet troop level throughout the Northern Territories
had increased to 10,000, with an army division headquarters
130
on Iturup. It was also announced that the discovery of
the Soviet deployments on Shikotan and the calculations of
Soviet forces had been obtained from United States intel-
ligence sources. In December 1980 the JDA revealed that
two new airfields were under construction by the Soviets
132 . .in Iturup. Protests and counter-protests, petitions and
refusals to accept them have stone-walled any discussion
between the two governments about the current situation.
2 . Intentions and Motivations
While slightly facilitating the air and ground mis-
sions of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East, the over-
whelming military value of the Northern Territories is in the
benefits they bring to the Soviet Navy. Soviet Naval Com-
mander-in-Chief Sergei Gorshkov's strategy vis-a-vis Japan
during a conflict is to sever it from North America and
Western Europe and ultimately (if necessary) threaten its
133
very survival. The Gorshkov conventional navy is cited as
being forward-deployed, anti-carrier, anti-strategic submarine,
134
and performing a valuable diplomatic and political role."
The possession of the Northern Territories greatly enhances
the execution of these goals. Admiral Gorshkov's insistence
on an ever-expanding ring of air and naval bases further
dictates that functional roles are allocated to the southern
135Kuriles. The six naval functions of the Northern
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Territories are: (1) serve as an ice-free, full-fledged naval
base, (2) extend the anti-submarine, anti-carrier aircraft
platforms for increased coverage, (3) serve to insure free
access to and from the open ocean, (4) operate as logistical
replenishment stations for the rest of the region, (5) enhance
the potential for interdicting sea lines of communication
between Japan and the outside world, and (6) hamper U.S. naval
operations in the area.
There also appears to be a conscious effort by the
Russian navy to relocate some of its forces from Vladivostok
and the Maritime Provinces to Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk, and
13 6
other bases rimming the Sea of Ohkotsk. Building-up of
the Korsakov naval base on Sakhalin would seem to be a viable
alternative. Vladivostok, the present Pacific Fleet head-
quarters, is not only vulnerable to Chinese attack, but it is
nearly completely surrounded by non-Soviet territory. A base
at Korsakov, only eighty miles from Hokkaido, together with
Soviet possession of the Northern Territories, allows the
Soviet Navy to completely avoid the three chokepoints at
Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Should Korsakov become the new
center of Soviet naval activity in the Far East, the Kurile
chain would become more important as a necessary shield.
Tactically, the Northern Territories are, as pre-
viously stated, excellent for projecting military operations
against Hokkaido. Amphibious, airborne, heliborne, and motor-
ized forces can all be deployed from the Northern Territories.
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Admittedly/ the capability to mount such an offensive is
modest at present, but the introduction into the Pacific Fleet
of the VTOL aircraft carrier Minsk and the modern amphibious
ship Ivan Rogov considerably increases the capabilities of
the Soviets to conduct such an exercise. These and other
types of offensive military equipment into the region gives
Japanese defense officials pause to wonder about their ulti-
137
mate use.
Clearly one of the primary motivations for the military
buildup in the Northern Territories is to bring political pres-
sure to bear on the Japanese. The Japanese fully realize the
Russian navy's ability to threaten the maritime lifeblood of
Japan. The Northern Territories forces serve as a not-so-
subtle reminder of this vulnerability and the overwhelming
power the Soviets could, if needed, apply. Frequent artillery
and missile firing practices, numerous violations of Japanese
airspace, and the arbitrary clearing of Japanese fishermen
from waters designated for military maneuvers all serve as
heavy-handed attempts to reinforce Japanese insular
vulnerabilities
.
Levels and activities of the Russian military forces
have varied with the political distances between the countries
in the region. As has been noted, close Sino-Japanese rela-
tions have seen the buildup in the Soviet Kurile forces, while
problems between Japan and her two big friends in the region,
the U.S. and the PRC, have witnessed a more moderate stance




The only comments coming out of Moscow concerning the
deployment of military forces in the Northern Territories has
been a determination to portray the deployments as an "internal
affair" directed against a potential Chinese attack, although
how that might involve the Northern Territories is unspecified.
A Soviet general has been quoted by Kyodo News Serve as ack-
nowledging the presence of "several battalions" on the
islands.
Military force levels in the Northern Territories are
estimated at approximately 10,000 - which includes ground
139forces, air crews, naval support, and logistical personnel.
Surrounding Japan in the Northeast Asia region there are fif-
teen Soviet divisions in the Maritime Provinces, two divisions
on Sakhalin, one division in Kamchatka, some 75,000 KGB bor-
der guards, as well as the Soviet Pacific Fleet and over 2,000




Ground forces in the Northern Territories consist of
a motorized rifle division, approximately 6,000 men, with its
141divisional headquarters located at Tenni on Iturup. The
divisional headquarters is known to have direct connections
with the Far East regional army headquarters at Khabarovsk.
142Their equipment consists of the following:
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approximately 50 tanks (T62, T64 vintage)
12 Mi24 assault helicopters (w/anti-tank missiles)
130mm artillery (usually found at corps level)
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns
"Gainful" surface-to-air missiles
BMP, BTR-50P armored personnel carriers
Their small arms are believed to be of the latest Soviet
manufacture. Although in garrison configuration, the ground
forces possess the capability to mount amphibious, motorized,
or vertical lift assaults on limited objectives for limited
periods of time, providing its own air defense and own fire
support. Some 2,000 to 5,000 KGB border guards, with 10
143patrol boats, are also stationed in the Northern Territories.
5. Naval Activities
The Northern Territories provide the Soviet Pacific
Fleet with nine fully operational anchorages/harbors. Be-
cause the Pacific Fleet has been reinforced and upgraded more
than any other service in the Far East, this must certainly
be a welcome asset for the Russians. As Soviet naval power
grows in rimming the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kurile bases become
even more valuable. Soviet naval forces conduct numerous
practice missile firings in the Northern Territories' waters,




Three sizeable airfields are known to exist in the
Northern Territories - one on Iturup at Tenni (3,000 meters
long) and two on Kunashir at Tofutsu (2,6 00 meters) and
Furukamappu (2,000 meters). The field at Tenni is capable of
85

handling any aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Reports from
the JDA have stated that two additional runways are under
construction on Iturup. Approximately twenty-four MIG-17's
are scattered among these fields; they are scheduled to be
144
replaced with MIG-23's and SU-19's. The most likely use
for the fighters would seem to be for air defense and close
air support of ground troops.
7 . Reactions
Japanese official reaction, while privately worried,
was originally to declare that the Soviet troops posed no
145
real threat to Japan. This line soon changed. With the
Russian naval visits to Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam, the invasion
of Afghanistan, and the reinforcement of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet, attitudes concerning the military developments changed.
The deployment of the Ivan Rogov to the Far East shattered,
for many, the concept of "no threat." The recognition of the
Ivan Rogov as an offensive ship, Soviet practice amphibious
assaults in Iturup (which JDA officials have noted closely
corresponds to the topography of Japan's west coast), and
numerous missile and artillery firings that endanger Japanese
fishermen were incidents that led to the labeling of Soviet
forces in the southern Xuriles as "extremely provocative,"
3 46
an "illegal occupation," and "extremely regretable. " While
most Japanese do not believe that the Soviet Union intends
to invade Japan, they do seem to recognize the merits of a
vigilant monitoring of the situation. The JDA has recognized
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the reduced warning time that Japan would have in the event
of a Soviet attack. A retired Self Defense Force general
estimated that Soviet invasion forces deployed from the Mari-
time Provinces would give Japan five to seven days of warning
time to prepare as compared to two days if the forces were
147deployed from the Northern Territories.
The Chinese reaction has been to warn the Japanese
that they are becoming an increasingly likely target for
148Soviet hegemomsm. They have taken the opportunity to
urge increased Japanese defense expenditures. The United
States has been relatively quiet about the buildup but has
steadily passed intelligence data to the Japanese concerning
the Soviet deployments in anticipation that it will increase
the willingness of the Japanese to spend more in their defense
87

VI. THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE
The Japanese perspective of the Northern Territories is
shaped by three factors - the historical distrust of the
Russians, the demands of politics in a free society, and an
emotional attachment (real or contrived) to some 5,000 square
kilometers of volcanic protrusions. Relative to the Soviet
viewpoint, the Japanese outlook centers not so much on the
security of Japan as it does on the very essence and charac-
ter of the nation of Japan.
A. THE JAPANESE CONCEPT OF THEIR TERRITORY
The Japanese concept of territory differs considerably
from that of the Russians. It is based less on historical
and pragmatic considerations and more on the cultural and
racial distinctiveness of the Japanese. A significant barrier
to the solution of the Northern Territories dispute will be
the ability of either side to philosophically accept a formula
or agreement that runs counter to what they have professed to
be in their national interest.
1 . The Japanese Concept
According to ancient Japanese mythology, reinforced
neatly by the religion of Shinto, the Japanese Islands were
149
created by the gods. Though the aboriginal Ainu had to be
driven out of the islands, there was no doubt as to the belief
that the islands of Japan were divine gifts to the chosen
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people. The demise of the thirteenth century Mongol invasions
by fortuitous circumstances strengthened the Japanese belief
that their land was blessed with a "divine uniqueness." The
isolation of Japan from the Asian continent and the relative
homogeneity of its people have reinforced that view. Profes-
sor Kimura Hiroshi of Hokkaido University states it this way:
Because of Japan's natural sea borders, the Japanese
people have come to take it for granted that the natural,
racial, linguistic, and cultural boundaries must coincide
with political and administrative borders . . . the Japan-
ese view that each nation has its own inherent or in-
alienable territories, the land that is regarded
historically and legally as part of a particular country
alone. 150
2 . The Northern Territories as Inherent Japanese Lands
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the
Japanese today regard the Northern Territories as inherent
Japanese territory, but a reasonable survey of the literature
written by Japanese on the subject would give the impression
that the "inherent lands" theory retains strong adherence in
the general population. The campaign for the reversion of
Okinawa, as well as public opinion polls on the subject, also
give strong indicators that the people of Japan feel as though
the southern Kuriles are without doubt Japanese.
Despite the legalistic arguments of treaties and war-
time agreements, Tokyo contends that the waters around the
southern Kuriles have always been traditional Japanese fishing
grounds and that the only people to live in the Northern
Territories (disregarding, of course, the Ainu) for any ap-
preciable time have been Japanese, as evidenced by the 19 45
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eviction of 16,000 Japanese Northern Territories settlers.
Officials in Tokyo and many in the general public express
bewilderment that the Russians cannot accept the assertion
151
that the Northern Territories are inviolably Japanese.
The Japanese position has been to distinguish between
two clearly different phenomenon - their defeat in World War
II and the retention of the right to negotiate changes in ter-
152
ritorial possessions. Although defeated, Japan, in accept-
ing the Potsdam Proclamation, was allowed to retain "minor
islands" to be determined by the Allies and thus any loss of
sovereignty over Japan's Northern Territories would require
the participation of Japan and the Soviet Union in territorial
negotiations
.
Some Japanese see the return of the southern Kuriles
as a symbolic or psychological objective of Japanese diplomacy
The return of the "inviolable" Japanese islands would signal,
for many, the final end to the Pacific War. Former Prime
Minister Sato once said "... the post-war period will not end
154
until the Northern Territories have been returned." The
mayor of Nemuro, the Hokkaido city directly across from the
Habomais , has said, "The simple fact is that the northern
islands issue has carried over from World War II, and the war
155is not yet over in Nemuro." The return of the islands






Peripheral to the concept of inherent Japanese ter-
ritory is a psychological trait of the Japanese that may, in
some way, explain why they so tenaciously press the Northern
Territories issue despite the fact that they face a nation of
vast military power who historically has been difficult to
obtain concessions from when in a position of strength.
The psychological trait is called amae, the noun form
of the verb amaeru , and it means roughly "to look to others for
affection." It is difficult for most non-Japanese to under-
stand, and Frank Gibney ' s Japan: The Fragile Superpower is
recommended for its excellent attempt to define what can be a
157terribly confusing abstraction. In personal relationships
amae means one person's passive reliance on another who is in
a position of seniority or superiority. A Japanese child
accepts the authority of his parents, but also expects their
indulgence in caring for him.
Amae , though most prevalent in interpersonal relation-
ships, can appear on a group scale. The demuring behavior of
the Japanese people during the U.S. occupation was, in part, a
function of the amae syndrome at work - acceptance of the
authority of the occupiers (superior position), yet expecting
the indulgence ascribed to the vanquished (inferior position)
.
The point here is not to draw a parallel between the
personal and societal actions of the Japanese, but to point
out that amae may, in some manner, help explain the reason
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Japanese express incredulousness at the Soviet position of
not granting any concessions in the Northern Territories when
they command such a dominant position in the dispute. Former
Prime Minister Fukuda told a Soviet official, "Why is your
country concerned about such tiny islands? The territories
which we have been requesting from your country occupy only a
minor, insignificant portion of such a huge, vast country as
158yours." A Japanese commentator for NHK Television Network
in Japan asked the Soviet ambassador to Japan, "As I said
earlier, the Soviet Union is a big power, and I want to ask
you again if the Soviet Union cannot show magnanimity in deal-
159ing with us and come to the negotiating table? And in his
closing remarks the commentator said to his audience:
As you might have noticed, Ambassador Polyansky
gave the strong impression that he stood on firm prin-
ciples and would never budge from them, not even an
inch. I felt that his conviction seems to be incompre-
hensible to us if we try to perceive it according to
our own way of thinking. It was incomprehensible if
measured by the Japanese yardstick. 160
B. AN INDEPENDENT JAPAN
Postwar Japanese foreign policy has been based on four
elements: dependence on the United States for its physical
protection; an "omnidirectional" approach for striving for
good relations with all countries, as well as maintaining
political "equidistance" between China and the Soviet Union;
use of economic interdependence among nations as a tool for
world stability; and the policy of seikei bunri (separation
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of politics and economics) to avoid linkages. This foreign
policy reflects Japan's dependence on the external world and
its relatively weak defense structure. Two major criticisms
are leveled at the conduct of Japanese foreign affairs; the
criticisms, from both external and internal sources, are
that Japanese diplomacy is based on a near-total dependence
on the United States and that it is a product of an unprin-
cipled, economically-motivated entity that makes opportunistic
shifts in its policy to increase its economic wealth without
assuming political liabilities.
The Japanese leadership is sensitive to these criticisms.
They readily admit their dependence on the physical protection
provided by the United States but reject the assertions that
their foreign policy is only a reflection of economic imperial-
ism and opportunism. The Northern Territories have provided
the Japanese leadership with an issue that can be used to
counter these accusations
.
1. Seikei Bunri and the Equidistance Policies Abandoned
Japanese-Soviet relations are conspicuous because of
the deliberate abandonment of the seikei-bunri policy. The
Japanese have conspicuously linked their reluctance to coop-
erate economically with the Soviets to other actions taken
by the USSR. The historical distrust of the Soviets, "frustra-
tions caused by Soviet inconsistency, annoyance, and secretive-
ness," the intimidating nature of Soviet military power, and
the Northern Territories dispute have caused this aberration
1 C 1
in Japanese bilateral relations.
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Although the Soviets have attempted to make "mutual
economic benefit" the basis for Japanese-Soviet relations,
the tremendous value that could accrue to both sides through
16 2increased trade has, so far, gone unrealized. The Japan-
ese need for raw materials, the proximity of Siberian riches,
and the rising trade controversies between the Japan, the
United States, and the European Community are seen by many
observers as sufficient reasons for Japan to cultivate close
economic ties with the Soviet Union. Pragmatic considerations
(Russian shortage of foreign currency, labor, infrastructure,
and attractive projects) have limited the optimistic estimates
of trade opportunities. But the real stumbling block to
increased joint economic effort is the Japanese abandonment
of seikei bunri and the conscious effort to tie Soviet con-
cessions in the Northern Territories to expanded economic
cooperation.
The Northern Territories problem provided an excellent
example of the reversal of the "equidistance" policy of the
Japanese concerning the USSR and the PRC. The Japanese had
attempted innumerable times since the end of World War II to
bring the Soviets to the negotiating table to discuss the
territorial issue. The Russians refused, while using the
Northern Territories as a political carrot for influencing
Japanese behavior and furthering their own purposes. Finally,
a combination of Soviet intransigence on the territorial issue,
the buildup of Soviet military power in the region, and
94

Russian intimidation of Japan during the Sino-Japanese PFT
talks convinced Tokyo to accept the treaty with its modified
anti-negemony clause, thereby aligning itself (however
16 3
slightly) with Peking; the "equidistance" policy had tilted.
Conversely, a Soviet concession on the Northern Territories
would probably have convinced the Japanese of the value of
164
their "omnidirectional" evenhandedness with all nations.
David Rees commented on the Northern Territories issue:
. . . there is every reason to suppose that the con-
tinuing dispute will not only preclude a Japanese-
Soviet peace treaty, but will directly help to cement
Japan's recent ties with China, so as to translate
Japanese resentment over the Northern Territories
into a specifically anti-Soviet mode. 16 5
2. Resistance to the Strong
Since the return of Okinawa in 1972, Japanese territo-
rial claims have focused on the Northern Territories . In
recent years, Tokyo has responded to Soviet intransigence on
the issue with increased assertiveness . Much has been written
in Japan about the Russian insensitivity to Japanese points
of view and concerns; in commentaries concerning Japanese-
Soviet relations the opinion is continually expressed that it
is wrong to give in to the Russians, or any other opponent,
16 6just because they possess overwhelming power.
Along with this assertiveness on the territorial issue,
the Japanese have undertaken several activities to portray a
more positive, independent Japan. In establishing its 2 00-
mile off-shore economic zone in the 1977 Diet, Tokyo has per-
sistently interpreted its zone as encompassing the southern
16 7
Kurile waters. Japanese Maritime Safety Agency vessels
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have entered the 200-mile zone just east of Sakhalin (which
is claimed by the Soviets to be Russian waters) to give advice
and aid to Japanese fishing boats, and the Soviets have not
interfered. Despite de facto control by the Russians over
the Northern Territories and their waters, Japanese fishing
vessels, with full knowledge of Tokyo, enter southern Kurile
waters and keep alive the claims of Japanese ownership. Dur-
ing fishing negotiations the Japanese have been extremely
reluctant to accept Russian catch quotas, licenses, and on-
board inspections so as not to cement the arguments of the
Soviets that the Northern Territories and the adjacent waters
belong to them.
The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in February 1979
proclaiming the Northern Territories to be Japanese land and
urging the prime minister's office to demand the immediate
1 c g
withdrawal of Soviet forces on the islands. When the
Japanese ambassador in Moscow attempted to deliver the resolu-
tion to the Russian government, the Soviet deputy foreign
minister refused to accept it, saying the issue "... may be of
great concern for the Japanese, but it is not for the
169Russians." The contempt of the Soviet government for a
duly promulgated resolution from the Japanese government could
not have helped but incensed Tokyo.
The Japanese are also turning-up the diplomatic heat
concerning the Northern Territories, not with any wild dreams
of Soviet capitulation, but for keeping the issue alive,
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embarrassing the Russians, and demonstrating that, though
weak in comparison to the Russians, it will not be broken
into abandoning its territorial claims. Foreign Minister
Ito brought the Northern Territories issue before the United
Nations General Assembly in September 1980, the first time
that has occurred since 1972. ± The Kremlin was unfuriated
that the Japanese would take the matter before the General
Assembly and responded by labeling the Japanese claim as
"unrealistic and illegal demands." A non-partisan Diet-
men's mission took the Northern Territories roadshow to
Europe in September 1981 with stops in Bonn, London, and
Helsinki before visiting the UN in an effort to drum-up sup-
port for their position. The mission reported to the Diet
that all of the officials contacted expressed sympathy and
understanding for the Japanese position and that the U.S.
permanent mission to the UN in New York "offered to play an
active role in the UN General Assembly and other international
172bodies" in support of the Japanese position. In October
1981 the mayor of Nemuro headed a mission of citizens from
Hokkaido to the United States to seek assistance in achieving
the reversion of the islands. The Japanese met with the chief
of the State Department's Japan desk and the head of the Soviet
desk, eliciting an assurance of U.S. support for their
173
claims. The Hokkaido group then proceeded to New York and
the UN where they distributed pamphlets and maps concerning
the territorial issue. The Japanese government continuously
97

protests the practice firings of Soviet weaponry in the waters
of the southern Kuriles which endangers the lives of Japanese
174fishermen. All of the missions, groups, and protests are
not made in the expectation of actually obtaining Soviet con-
cessions, but they do tweak the nose of the Russian bear and
demonstrate that, though relatively weak, Japan will not be
intimidated by the Soviets or compromised on the issue. In
addition, the Japanese stance toward the USSR on the problem
lends credibility in Peking and Washington (and with the people
of Japan) to Tokyo's image as an independent diplomatic
... 175
entity.
The Japanese have attempted to make cosmetic changes
to further substantiate their claims. In 1970 the Ministry of
Education advised all of the nation's textbook publishers to
insure that the Northern Territories were depicted in the same
176
color as Japan proper and different from the Soviet Union.
In July 1980, April 1981, and again in October 1981 the Japan-
ese Foreign Ministry advised its representatives in the forty-
eight countries who were signatories of the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty to seek their host government's cooperation in
asking all cartographers in their countries to portray the
177Northern Territories as Japanese lands. Other foreign map
publishers have also been contacted. Some nations have res-
ponded, but not as many as had been hoped for. Another il-
lustration of the Japanese insistence on the correct depiction
of territorial ownership is that the term "middle line" is
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used rather than "territorial waters" to delineate the extent
17 8
of Soviet waters around the southern Kuriles.
3 . Principle
As previously stated, one of the criticisms of Japan-
ese foreign policy has been that it is wishy-washy and swings
with the political breezes. The territorial issue provides
Japan with an example where they have taken a stand on
principle. They can point to their unrelenting stance of
yontoo ikkatsu (four islands in one bundle) before a Japanese-
Soviet peace treaty is to be signed as a demonstration of con-
sistency in foreign policy. The Japanese hope it may dispel
some of the charges that Tokyo's conduct in foreign affairs
179
is characterized by frequent opportunistic switches. The
unsuccessful attempt by the Soviets in 1978 to influence the
Japanese in their treaty negotiations with the Chinese can
be attributed, in part, to the conviction of the Japanese
that their claims in the Northern Territories are just and
that they could not be intimidated into abandoning it.
C. MAINTAINING DISTANCE FROM THE RUSSIAN BEAR
The historic distrust and dislike between Russians and
Japanese is an assumption that cannot be overlooked without a
closer examination from the Japanese perspective. From the
first contacts in the seventeenth century to the present, the
animosities have run deep. Can it be that the Northern Ter-
ritories problem is not so much a desire by the Japanese to
regain lost territory as it is a campaign to prevent the
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development of inter-state affairs with a nation whose inten-
tions and methods are highly suspect?
1. Historical Distrust and Dislike
The historic animosity between the Japanese and Rus-
sians has already been mentioned, but it is important to
reiterate these emotive factors in evaluating the Japanese
position in the Northern Territories. In 1862 the Japanese
scholar Yukichi Fukuzawa wrote, "At any rate, I decided that
Russia was a country in which we could not safely unburden
18
our minds." To a considerable degree, the sentiment ex-
pressed by Fukuzawa remains the same today. The Soviets are
accused of activities that are "exactly the same as those of
181tsarist Russia." Soviet involvement in Africa, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and now Poland have done little to dispel their
negative image; military forces in the Northern Territories,
violations of Japanese airspace, and the towing of a damaged
nuclear submarine through Japanese waters are examples of the
kind of actions that cause a mistrust of the Soviets. The
Japanese Defense Agency contends that the Soviet Union and
its military forces present the only plausible armed threat
18 2
to Japan. In an October 19 80 nationwide poll conducted
by the Tokyo Shimbun , 76.7% of the respondents identified the
Soviet Union as a country that "may pose a military threat to




The Russians are also cited for their "high-handedness
and contemptuous attitude" and the demeanor that the Soviets
184
portray of being racially superior. The Soviet unilateral
promulgation of draft treaties, agreements, and proposals
are indications to the Japanese that Moscow feels, because
of its superior military power, it can do whatever it wants
to in its relations with Tokyo. The Japanese are also aware
of what they see as the Russians ' "utter ignorance and insen-
185
sitivity" on matters involving Japanese society.
In regards to the Northern Territories, Tokyo points
out that Japan has territorial disputes with the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, but at least
these nations (unlike the Soviet Union) have been willing to
discuss their differences. The Chinese in April 1978 tried
to intimidate Japan in the Senkaku Islands by sending more
than one hundred armed fishing boats to surround the islands,
but the PRC, say the Japanese, soon learned that the use of
threats and military pressures against Japan were counter-
is £>productive and stopped it. The Japanese contend that the
Russians have learned nothing from that example and have lost
more than they could have hoped to have gained when the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed. By clinging
to the southern Kuriles and arming the islands, the USSR,
Tokyo claims, is attempting "to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into
n. i * -.187its inland sea.
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2 . The Northern Territories as a Shield
There are perhaps many varied and (to the Japanese)
valid reasons for keeping the territorial issue alive in the
face of Soviet immobility. Perhaps it is principle; perhaps it
is an effort to get Soviet concessions in other areas such
as fishing or Siberian resource development; perhaps it is a
symbolic issue that involves the very psyche of the "Japanese
mind"; perhaps it is a pragmatic tool to use in gaining accept-
ance in an anti-Soviet alliance managed by Washington and
Peking; or perhaps it is a belief that the islands are, in
fact, "inherent" Japanese territory. All of these motivations
have some shred of merit. But they do not tell the full story.
Japanese suspicions of Russian intentions are as strong as
ever. Perhaps then it is that the Northern Territories issue
is used by the Japanese to prevent the improvement of relations
that would, from Tokyo's viewpoint, increase Japanese depend-
ence on Russian trade and resources, making Japan an economic
hostage, weakening Japanese-American ties, and "Finlandizing"
Japan into a colony of Soviet imperialism.
The territorial question pervades all aspects of
Japanese-Soviet relations. Recently (September 1981) a joint
trade unionist meeting of Japanese and Soviet labor leaders
broke-up over the territorial issue; even a visiting Soviet
female cosmonaut, who was heading a non-political women's
exchange group, found Tokyo officials harsh in their condemna-
18 3tion of the Soviet position in the Northern Territories.
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Quite naturally, the Soviets have accused the current Japan-
ese leadership (with American and Chinese backing) of using
the Northern Territories to prevent the "establishment of a
18 9
necessary treaty foundation under Soviet-Japanese relations."
The Japanese, for their part, cannot and will not admit that it
is mutual distrust and hatred that keeps the two countries
apart; it is much more convenient to blame the poor relations
on the stumbling block of the Northern Territories. Reinhard
Drifte, a professor of Japanese foreign policy at Geneva's
Graduate Institute of International Studies, has said, "If
the Northern Territories problem did not exist, the Japanese
would have to create it - they have a natural antipathy toward
190the Soviet Union."
Japanese officials understand the Soviet point of view
and their deep concern with national security; the Russian
position in the Northern Territories and their determination
to retain the islands are well comprehended in knowledgeable
Japanese circles. And thus statements such as, "But in the
1990' s, in order to achieve a true partnership with Japan,
they must return the islands," only serve to demand what is,
under the present circumstances, unattainable from the
191Russians. If the Japanese are truly desirous of a
friendly association with the USSR, why did Tokyo ignore
Brezhnev's recent (September 1981) call for improved relations,
and for what purpose (other than political mileage) did Prime
Minister Suzuki conduct an "inspection" of the Northern
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Territories? The answer seems to be that the Japanese have
departed from their normal seikei bunri course, and because of
historic distrust, linkage is the policy that Tokyo is deter-
mined to use with the USSR. In an address to the House of
Councillors, Suzuki stated that Japan did not seek confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union, but declared that his government
would not adopt a "loose-principled" policy of separating
192politics from economics in dealing with the Russians.
The Japanese have made it clear that they will not take the
initiative in seeking an improvement in the relationship, and
the Northern Territories dispute may be used as an instrument
to guarantee that, within the foreseeable future, close rela-
tions will not come to pass.
D. JAPANESE POLITICS
A superficial look at the Japanese government and the
political scene would give one the sensation of an impressive
solidarity of Japan's political forces behind the reversion
of the Northern Territories. Since World War II ten Diet
resolutions calling for an "early resolution" to the territo-
rial problem have been passed and forwarded to the Japanese
government; the Diet has designated 7 February as an annual
"Northern Territories Day"; multi-party missions have been
sent to the Soviet Union, the United States, European countries,
and the United Nations to solicit support for a resolution to
the issue; the House of Representatives has a Special Committee
on Okinawa and the Northern Territories; and rallies and
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demonstrations calling for the return of the islands are
attended by leaders of all the major Japanese political
parties. Though impressive on the surface, the "united front"
shows cracks under closer scrutiny, for the aim of the polit-
ical parties is to gain and maintain political power, and
the territorial issue is a tool for such ends.
1 • Political Parties and Their Positions
The differing positions of the political parties on
the territorial issue present interesting illustrations of
Japanese politics at work. All of them know that the issue
has political weight with the electorate, and to renounce
Japanese claims to the islands, however unrealistic those
demands may be, would be political hara kiri . The national-
istic sentiment that the Northern Territories evoke is such
that no group seeking a role in determining Japan's political
future can afford to ignore it.
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the current
ruling party of Japan, and the Japanese view of the territo-
rial issue ( yontoo ikkatsu ) that has previously been expressed
is that of the LDP. Again, their position is that Iturup,
Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomais are "inherent" Japanese
territory which were not included in Japan's renunciation of
the Kuriles in 19 51. These four islands, say the LDP, must
be returned to Japan prior to a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty,
and the disposition of the remainder of the Kuriles should be
settled by a bilateral conference.
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The Komeito (Clean Government Party) and the Demo-
cratic Socialist Party (DSP) agree with the position of the
LDP, but while the DSP proposes a bilateral conference (Japan
and the USSR) to settle the status of the remainder of the
Kuriles, the Komeito prefers a trilateral conference (includ-
ing the United States) to decide whether the rest of the
Kuriles should be placed under UN trusteeship or given out-
right to Japan.
The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) , the leading opposi-
tion party in the Diet, asserts that all of the Kuriles (which
it says includes Iturup and Kunashir) are "inalienable" Japan-
ese territory and criticizes the LDP for limiting Japanese
claims to just the Northern Territories. They favor regain-
ing the Habomais and Shikotan upon the conclusion of a peace
treaty with the Russians. Subsequent to a peace treaty, the
JSP would, through "good and positive action" (including a
total reexamination of Japanese-U . S . relations), negotiate
193
with the Soviets to regain the entire Kurile archipelago.
The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) asserts that the
answer to the problem lies in developing friendly relations
with the Soviet Union. The JCP says that a peace treaty
should be immediately signed and the Habomais and Shikotan
returned. The remainder of the Kuriles should be returned





The party platforms from the LDP, Komeito, and the DSP
are not surprising. But the Kremlin has been especially dis-
turbed by the stances taken by the leftist parties, the JSP
and the JCP. Although a small JCP slinter group calling itself
the Voice of Japan has echoed the Soviet line, the leftist
political movement in Japan is strongly in favor of the Northern
Territories being returned to Japanese control. Soviet criti-
cism of the JCP has been especially gruff, saying "certain
parties which are usually called 'progressive' have allowed
194themselves to be drawn into an ultranationalist orgy." The
JCP has continuously sent "open letters" to the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) , only to be rebuffed as being
"extremely detrimental to the international Communist and gen-
195
eral democratic movement."
The JSP has been particularly harsh in their evaluation
of the presence of Russian military forces in the Northern
Territories. The JSP party chairman, Ichio Asukata, stated,
The military installations, because of their proxi-
mity to Japan, have only a first-strike capability and
almost no defense value. Thus, I see no serious effects
on the Soviet military posture in the area if the bases
are removed.-'-^
Over three years ago Asukata proposed to the Soviets that
Hokkaido and all of the Kuriles (to include the Northern Ter-
ritories) be established as demilitarized zones; the proposal,
197
rather expectedly, was rejected.
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2 . Using the Northern Territories
All of the Japanese political parties, some government
agencies, and many of the major labor and industrial organiza-
tions are adept at utilizing the Northern Territories issue
for their own benefit. Their directions and techniques are
varied, but they all share the goal of increasing their own
political influence.
The current LDP government is a good example. Prime
Minister Suzuki's apparently successful meeting with President
Ronald Reagan (May 1981) went awry back in Japan over the
wording of the joint communique and its implications for U.S.-
Japanese relations; the debate resulted in the resignation of
Foreign Minister Ito and the questioning of the strength of
the Suzuki government. As many others before him have dis-
covered, Suzuki found that when things are going rough at
home, it is frequently helpful to focus on threats from
abroad. On 21 July the LDP announced the initiation of a
month-long campaign across Japan to enhance public awareness
of the Northern Territories dispute. Suzuki himself made an
"inspection" of part of the Habomais from a helicopter on
10 September and met with Hokkaido residents to hear their
views on the problem. LDP officials privately admitted that
the activities were designed to shore-up Suzuki's image in




The issue has also been used by the Japan Defense
Agency and others interested in seeing Japan's armed forces
enlarged and modernized. The Soviet military build-up in
the southern Kuriles has given the defense community plenty
of ammunition to use in the budget fight. A "new and per-
ilous threat" was now on the Japanese doorstep, for the Soviet
soldiers in the Northern Territories became "the knife at
199Japan's throat" and "an indirect invasion." While the
Japanese public could shrug its shoulders at the Russian
violations of Japanese airspace, the presence of numerous
Soviet divisions surrounding Japan, and the SS-20's pointed
in their direction, they were not allowed to ignore the 6,000
soldiers to the north. The JDA milked it for all it was
worth. The Ground Self Defense Force Chief of Staff said:
As a result of the unexpectedly speedy Soviet mili-
tary buildup, in both quantity and quality, it will be
difficult to cope with the situation by relying on the
strength of the Japanese Self Defense Forces as en-
visaged in the defense program; a revision of the de- ~
nnfense program should be considered in the near future.
The JDA also leaked a series of reports portraying an increase
in the quantity and capabilities of new Russian military bases
in the Northern Territories just at the time when the Diet
was discussing the merits of purchasing more U.S. -made anti-
2 01
submarine aircraft. The matter was settled favorably for
the JDA, and shortly afterwards the JDA quietly announced
that the presence of the new bases could not be confirmed.
Critics warn that the LDP "hawks" are using the territorial
question to increase defense spending and thereby quiet
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American demands for an increased Japanese role in its own
202defense. And there can be little doubt that at the very-
least the Northern Territories have been used as a vehicle
for increased public awareness of defense-related matters.
Other parties have manipulated the issue, too. The
JCP has pointed to its position in the Northern Territories
as proof to the Japanese electorate that it is a Japanese
party and not part of an international communist conspiracy.
In 1971 the JCP chairman Kenji Miyamoto met with CPSU chair-
man Brezhnev to discuss problems between the JCP and the
CPSU. Miyamoto made headlines in Japan when he reported that
Brezhnev had agreed to discuss the territorial claims (denied
203by the Soviet Foreign Ministry) . At a press conference
after a 1979 JCB/CPSU meeting, Miyamoto again exploited the
moment to report that about half of the discussion time was
devoted to the Northern Territories and the associated
204problems. That day the Asahi Evening News headlined,
"Miyamoto Claims Way Has Been Opened for Territorial Talks."
The Japanese Socialist Party, besides proposing the
demilitarization of Hokkaido and the Kuriles, has made
political progress out of the issue. In its desire to revise
U.S . -Japanese relations, the JSP leader, Ichio Asukata,
equated the American bases in Okinawa to the Russian bases
in the Northern Territories, and implied that the American
205bases posed a greater threat to Japan's security. The
New Liberal Club leaders visited Moscow in 1978 to discuss
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the territorial issue, and even the General Council of Trade
Unions of Japan (Sokyo) has its territorial platform and
activities. Political useage of the Northern Territories
issue in Japan reminds one of the traditional American campaign
practices of kissing babies and eating the local cooking -
not everyone enjoys it, but it must be done.
3 . The Northern Territories and Their Liabilities
Just as there are reasons for Japanese politicians to
add to the ramparts of the Northern Territories issue, there
are liabilities for such actions. In many ways it limits the
flexibility of Japanese diplomacy vis-a-vis the Russians and
restricts the pursuance of rational foreign policy. All of
the post-war Japanese prime ministers and their governments
have embraced, as an article of faith, the need for negotia-
tions for the return of the islands. An objective analysis
of that course of action has taken a back seat to the emotional
rhetoric of an unyielding, inflexible stance. For a Japanese
politician to question the right of his country's claim to
the Northern Territories is to pursue a course of political
impotence
.
A notable example was that of the prominent inter-
national affairs critic, former editor of the Japan Times
,
and sometimes government troubleshooter , Kazushige Hirasawa.
In an article written for a 1975 edition of Foreign Affairs
,
Hirasawa, in suggesting an answer to the Northern Teritories
stalemate, posed a three-part solution: (1) the Soviet Union
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should return the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan in accord-
ance with the 1956 Joint Declaration of Peace, (2) the Rus-
sians should grant Japanese fishermen access to southern
Kurile waters, and (3) a peace treaty should be signed be-
tween Japan and the USSR, leaving the question of Kunashir
and Iturup "frozen until the end of the present century",
allowing mutual trust and cooperation to buildup in other
areas and then open negotiations to determine the status of
20 6
the two larger islands. Hirasawa was roundly criticized
by just about everyone in Japan. He was criticized in the
media for weakening Japan's case and jeopardizing the on-
207going Smo-Japanese peace treaty talks. The non-govern-
mental revanchist organizations expressed disgust at the
proposal and derided his attempt to influence the Japanese
20 8position in a "foreign magazine." Hirasawa, who had close
ties to the then Prime Minister Miki, may have been sending
-
up a trial balloon for the Miki government. If that was the
intent, the government was soon convinced that to embrace
the Hirasawa proposal would be counterproductive and polit-
ically disasterous. Even more diabolical may have been the
possibility that the Miki government planned to use the
Hirasawa plan as an instrument for arousing an anti-Soviet
ground swell within the country.
A clear-headed national debate on the issue seems
improbable, almost to the point that one wonders if there
is a credible party or politician that would ever address
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the issue in a context other than demanding that which will
not be given.
The issue also erodes the independent nature of the
opposition parties. They must either mimic the government's
position or up the ante of the territory claimed to a level
that proves they are a Japanese party whose intentions are
out to protect the Japanese claims. And by doing so, they
lose legitimacy as a credible opposition. Of equal if not
greater concern is the effect on Japanese-Soviet relations.
The campaigns, demonstrations, and "inspection" tours are
guaranteed to provoke the Soviets. It is an unhealthy situa-
tion for all concerned; and although' the Japanese (and the
Russians) believe they have justifiable claims to the North-
ern Territories, to use the matter as a prod to goad a
political opponent is a risky undertaking and foolhardy in
light of the. fact that the Soviet Union is an Asian power
that will be on the East Asian scene, confronting Japan, for
the foreseeable future.
E. THE JAPANESE PUBLIC
Gauging public opinion on a particular subject is a pre-
carious business. Public opinion polls, surveys, and voting
patterns are perhaps some indicators of opinions or trends,
but they shed little light on the depth of convictions or
emotions or the extent to which an issue will be defended.
So it is with accurately measuring the attitudes of the Japan-




The government claims that the territorial issue com-
mands overwhelming support from the public. They cite the
fact that within the representative democracy of Japan, the
Diet has passed resolution after resolution calling for the
return of the islands and that all forty-eight prefectural
209
assemblies have adopted similar measures. A February 1979
Diet resolution initiated a petition for citizens to sign
calling for the return of the southern Kuriles; by the end
of November of the same year, over fifteen million signatures
had been obtained. Young C. Kim's survey of nationwide news-
paper polls on the 'subject highlight some interesting points:
(1) almost no one takes the position that the Soviets are
correct, (2) there is widespread support for the notion that
the islands are inherent Japanese lands, and (3) support for
the irredentist claim is strongest among Japan's elites
(business leaders, bureaucrats, academia, the media, politi-
210
cians, etc.) . What is not known is how much of the North-
ern Territories support is attributable to the general dislike
of the Soviet Union. The Russians have consistently been
rated by the Japanese as the most disliked country in the
world; support for the viewpoint may be a result of the
mental grouping of the issue with the sentiment for the USSR
as a whole.
The public prescription for solving the problem is
interesting. The Hokkaido Shimbun (12 August 1981) , in
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publishing the results of a poll it conducted among 1,000
Hokkaido residents, found that only .7% of the respondents
thought it was "not necessary" to request the reversion of
the islands. But in ascribing to the activity that they
thought would be most productive to realizing the return of
the Northern Territories, 31.5% said the southern Kuriles
should be demanded from the Soviets, whereas 59.0% said that
priority should be given to establishing economic and cultural
ties
.
Although the issue does not command the same emotional
punch as did the Okinawa reversion campaign, the media (a very
influential force) has been almost entirely with the government
The Japanese-Chinese rapproachment , the Russian stationing of
military forces in the Northern Territories, and other actions
(Afghanistan, Poland, etc.) have further turned media attentive-
ness to a suspicion of Soviet intentions.
2 . The Fishermen
Other than the 16,000 former residents of the Northern
Territories, the people most directly affected by the Soviet
aggrandizement of the islands have been the fishermen in the
area. The loss of the rich fishing grounds around the Kuriles
and the advent of the 200-mile economic zones have played
havoc on Japanese fishing. The Hokkaido fishermen, of course,
have been especially hard hit. In 1980 alone one out of every
211
six Hokkaido trawlers went out of business. Japanese fish-
ing, out of necessity, has evolved into an international
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enterprise that depends to an increasing degree on resources
located far away from the Japanese Islands, and that bodes
hard times for the small family fishing businesses of Hokkaido
Since 1977 Japan's catch in Russian-controlled waters
has been reduced by 40%, and in order to fish in the Soviet
waters (including the Northern Territories) , Japanese fisher-
men must pay fishing fees, obtain licenses, and submit to
on-board inspections by Russian patrol craft. Japan has
reluctantly accepted these restrictions because of its depend-
ence on fish as its primary source of protein, but in doing
so has given de facto recognition to the Russians that the
Northern Territories belong to the USSR. For those who fish
in the Russian waters without Soviet approval, the risk of
arrest and confiscation of the boats is constantly present.
Since 1945 thousands of Japanese fishermen have been arrested
212
and over a thousand boats confiscated.
As the Northern Territories rhetoric from Tokyo heats
up or "anti-Soviet" actions such as the Sino-Japanese PFT
occur, fishing grounds are placed off limits and arrests and
seizures are stepped-up. For the Japanese fishermen of
Hokkaido the territorial pursuits of their government present
a dilemma. As one fisherman put it:
I am a loyal Japanese. I think the four islands
belong to Japan. The Soviets should give them back.
But you can't deny that as of now there is no prospect
for an early return. We can't force the Soviets to
give them back. Meanwhile, our livelihood depends on the
fish we catch. The more fuss we make about the four
islands, the more likely the Soviets are to restrict
our fishing zones. 213
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The Russians have used their consulate-general office
in Sapporo to help set up branches of the Japanese-Soviet
Friendship Association in an effort, among other things, to
get Hokkaido citizens (especially fishermen) to renounce the
214government's aim of the reversion of the islands. The
Soviets have had some successes. Some fishermen have been
given temporary permits to fish in the Russian waters in
return for their promise of silence on the territorial issue.
Many fishermen believe that the payment of the $150 entrance
fee to join the friendship clubs is a form of insurance
215
against harsh treatment if caught by the Soviets. Of
Hokkaido's 50,000 fishermen, 500 or so have licenses to
operate within the Soviet zone, many having doubled their
216
catch. Although Tokyo frowns on the 500, it allows the
practice because as one Maritime Safety Agency official said,
"After all, we are a free enterprise economy, and the fisher-
man who catches more fish gets more money. That is our
dilemma.
3 . The Organized Reversion Movement
The organized irredentist movement consists of offi-
cial and quasi-official groups dedicated to the return of
the Northern Territories. There are four main groups among
the countless others that are the largest and the most
218influential. The League of Kurile-Habomais Residents
,
established in 1955, is based in Sapporo and limits its activi-
ties to assisting Kurile refugees and attending rallies and
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demonstrations. Its membership consists largely of former
inhabitants of the Kuriles and their descendants. The Head-
quarters for a Territorial Return and Northern Fisheries
Policy / established in 1956, is based in Sapporo and publishes
newsletters, bibliographies, and historical research on the
Kuriles. It is directed, staffed, and partially funded by
the Hokkaido prefectural government. The Alliance for the
Return of the Northern Territories , established in 1965, is
based in Tokyo and produces irredentist literature in Japan-
ese and English and frequently acts as a lobbying group in the
national and prefectural governments. Its board membership
includes many well-known retired government and military
officials and business leaders. Subsidized by both national
and prefectural governments, the Alliance, because of its
membership, is considered right-wing and anti-Soviet. The
Northern Territories Problem Association , established in
1969, is based in Tokyo and is considered the most influential
of the irredentist organizations. It is openly an instrument
of the LDP and subsidized from its national funds. Its pro-
nounced goal is "raising public consciousness and helping
displaced residents"; board membership consists of prominent
politicians, businessmen, and scholars.
All of the above organizations are supported by the
LDP and as such are used as political tools to gain visibility
for the LDP politicians and candidates. All of the organiza-
tions operate under the government's Northern Policy
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Headquarters , an agency created by Prime Minister Sato in
1972 to coordinate and supervise the reversion groups and
their activities and to dispense funds to those toeing the
219
LDP line. Because of LDP guidance, the irredentist groups
have been boycotted by the opposition parties, resulting in




VII. ROLES OF THE REGIONAL POWERS
Japanese-Soviet relations are, of course, to a significant
degree dictated by their relations with the other regional
powers. The countries of Asia and those with vested interests
in the region are particularly concerned about the degree of
cooperation in the Tokyo-Moscow connection; their perspectives
are always to be considered by Japan and the Soviet Union as
both sides seek to identify an acceptable balance in the
relationship. Of particular concern for each are the roles
played by the United States, the People's Republic of China,
and the two Koreas. The Northern Territories dispute is an
excellent barometer of these intertwining relationships.
A. THE UNITED STATES
Although occasional shipwrecked American sailors and
traders bound for the Japanese Islands happened to touch
Kurile shores, the United States had no interests in any of
the islands prior to World War II. At one time after the
recapture of the western Aleutians from the Japanese in 1943,
the Kuriles were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
a possible route to conduct the final assault of Japan. But
the unpredictable weather and Soviet refusal to allow American
bombers to utilize Kamchatka bases caused the abandonment of
fc , ., 220the idea.
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As previously stated, at Yalta President Roosevelt agreed
with Stalin that the Kuriles would be "handed over" to the
Russians as a stimulus for their participation in the final
stages of the war against Japan. After V-J Day the American
government denied any complicity in the Soviet occupation of
the islands. Secretary of State James Byrnes told a joint
session of Congress on 4 September 1945 that the United States
had made no commitment to sustain the USSR's Far Eastern gains.
In January 194 6 the secret agreements made at Yalta were
released to the public, and it was evident to all that the
United States had been a willing partner in the Kuriles 1 new
tenancy
.
The advent of the Cold War and the apprehension about
Soviet motives in the Far East brought on a change in American
attitudes concerning the Kuriles. In preparation for the im-
pending peace treaty with Japan, a State Department memo dated
14 October 1947 (and authored by George Kennan) recommended
that, "The southern-most islands of the Kurile archipelago
221
would be retained by Japan." An accompanying map delineated
all of the Northern Territories as Japanese possessions. The
recommendation was approved by Secretary of State George C.
Marshall and forwarded to SCAP headquarters in Tokyo.
In the negotiations leading up to the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951, the United States supported neither the Soviet
Union nor Japan's claims over the islands. John Foster Dulles,
the architect of the peace treaty, disputed the Soviet
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occupation of the Habomais and Shikotan, but used the naming
of a beneficiary to Iturup and Kunashir as an enticement for
Soviet participation at the peace conference. His strategy
was for Japan to renounce its claims to the Kuriles (which it
did) without naming the Russians as the new owners; that would
enhance the American bargaining position with both countries
at a conference to determine the fate of the Northern
Territories. During the treaty ratification process in the
United States, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added
a two-part proviso that stated that nothing in the treaty
reduced Allied or Japanese rights to the Kuriles or sanctioned
the Soviet aggrandizement of Japanese territory; the treaty
was then overwhelmingly passed.
Twice (in 1952 and 1954) American aircraft were shot down
by Soviet fighters after entering the airspace over the
Habomais, and twice the U.S. government issued statements
declaring that the Habomais and Shikotan were Japanese
territory. During one point in the negotiations for the
normalizations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 19 56 it
appeared as though a compromise on the Northern Territories
was possible; on 19 August 1956 Secretary of State Dulles
warned the Japanese foreign minister that an agreement to
hand over Iturup and Kunashir to the USSR would bring an
American request for permanent sovereignty over Okinawa. In
an effort to reduce the ominous tone of their threat, the
United States on 7 September 1956 sent Tokyo an aide-memoire
122

saying: (1) the Habcmais and Shikotan are an integral part
of Hokkaido, (2) the Yalta agreement was "simply a statement
of common purpose" rather than a firm commitment, and (3) the
final disposition of the Kuriles must be determined at an
222international conference.
During the last twenty-five years the United States has
played a limited role in the dispute, but has continued to
support the Japanese position. In 1968 a World Airways flight
carrying U.S. servicemen bound for Vietnam was forced to land
223
on Iturup after violating Kurile airspace. Washington
apologized to Moscow for violating Soviet airspace and then
had to apologize to Tokyo for apologizing to Moscow. Prime
Minister Sato at one time asked President Nixon to intercede
upon Japan's behalf at a summit conference with Premier
Brezhnev, a request that was not acted upon.
But because the Northern Territories problem has an ap-
parent low priority in U.S. relations with the countries
involved, one should not surmise that there is little for the
United States to be concerned about. A settlement of the prob-
lem and improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations could have
grave consequences for the United States. Resolution of the
territorial issue and its implications could graphically alter
the situation in East Asia. It is therefore not too cynical
to infer that the U.S. would prefer the current impasse in
order to help achieve some of its goals in East Asia: increased
Japanese defense responsibility in the region to assist in
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checking the growth of Soviet military forces, a continuation
of a perception by the nations of the region that Soviet aims
in Asia are suspect, and the prevention of Japanese-Soviet
cooperation. As evidence of the American desire to maintain
the status quo , one need only examine the timing of the U.S.
intelligence community's disclosure that the Russians had de-
ployed military forces on Shikotan Island. The evidence was
presented to the Japanese government on 25 September 1979,
just as Foreign Minister Sonoda and his Soviet counterpart,
Andrei Gromyko, were meeting at the United Nations to discuss
improved bilateral relations. The revelation also corresponded
with the Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee meeting
held in Moscow to discuss the possibility of expanding joint
economic projects in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The
Soviet response, via Radio Moscow, was prompt and livid:
It is not by accident that intelligence sources,
behind whom hides the enemy of international detente and
improved Soviet-Japanese relations, chose Sunday, 24
September, for disclosure of their report ... the pub-
lication on 24 September of the report is nothing but a
provocation aimed against the improvement of Soviet-
Japanese relations. 224
The reality of close Japanese-Soviet relations would be poten-
tially catastrophic to U.S. goals in East Asia. Because of
the need to prevent such an accommodation, the dissolution of
the Northern Territories problem might require the United
States to attempt to foment a comparable issue.
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B. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
As could be expected, the People's Republic of China
wholeheartedly supported Soviet claims to the Northern Ter-
ritories throughout the 1950 's. On 4 December 1950 Zhou En-
lai made a speech expressing total support for Soviet reten-
tion of the entire archipelago, and in 1953 Radio Peking
called the Japanese irredentist movement "war hysteria." But
as the 1960 's brought on the realization of an ever-widening
Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese position changed. Chairman
Mao Zedong, receiving an audience of members of the Japanese
Socialist Party on 10 July 1964, shockingly announced, "I
approve of the Kuriles being returned to Japan. Russia has
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already taken too much land." Mao then listed Xinjiang,
Outer Mongolia, the Amur region, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
the Baltic states as graphic examples of Soviet territorial
aggrandizement and assured his stunned listeners that the
Northern Territories were inseparable from China's own claims
against the Soviet Union. The unexpected support no doubt
heartened the Japanese and reinforced their perception of
the Soviets as a threatening imperialist power.
Since the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes along the Ussuri
River, Chinese support for Japan's territorial claims has
intensified as Peking sought regional allies against the Soviet
Union. On the eve of Prime Minister Tanaka's summit conference
with Premier Brezhnev in October 1973, China's United Nations
delegate, Qiao Guanhua , enumerated the PRC ' s support for Japan's
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Northern Territories stand in an address to the UN General
"7 9 f>
Assembly. To the present day, the Chinese defend the right
of the Japanese people to seek return of the islands that
"from time immemorial . . . have always been an intrinsic part
227
of Japan's territory." Of course, the Chinese position has
not evolved out of any sympathy for Japanese irredentism.
Chinese motives are fourfold: (1) China has its own territo-
rial claims against the Russians, (2) Peking has designs on a
closer relationship with Tokyo at the expense of the Soviets,
(3) the PRC can propagandize against the Soviets and their
"hegemonistic" behavior, and (4) China wants to reinforce its
own claims to Taiwan.
The struggle to contain the influence and the power of the
Soviet Union is probably a close second to the "Four Moderniza-
tions" program in the priorities of the Peking leadership. Its
importance is so great as to allow the Chinese to embrace the
United States and Japan as partners in its "anti -hegemony"
scheme in Asia. The growing menace of Soviet military power
in East Asia can only be a disheartening trend; while insignif-
icant by itself, a Soviet presence in the Northern Territories
as part of the overall growth of Soviet armed power presents a
growing strategic threat. In addition to a geo-strategic
confrontation in the region, the Chinese maintain their own
territorial demands against the Russians. The PRC still claims
some minor river islands near Khabarovsk and vast expanses of
wasteland west of Xinjiang. By supporting Japan's territorial
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claims, the Chinese have established a de facto "common front"
against Soviet territorial expansion.
1. Wooing the Japanese
The Chinese have used the Northern Territories issue to
cause the Japanese to abandon its professed "equidistance"
between the PRC and the USSR; Peking's goal has been to attract
Tokyo to its side while impeding any closer Japanese-Soviet
relations, especially economic and technological exchange
projects. In order to achieve the objective, the Chinese have
portrayed the territorial issue as a diplomatic, military, and
political assault on Japan by the Soviets. The Chinese pointed
to the Russian military maneuvers around the Northern Territo-
ries in mid-1978 as proof of Moscow's burning desire to prevent
the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and strutted
that "... all these maneuvers have only served to further con-
firm Soviet hegemonism. In the end, China and Japan have signed
22 8their treaty of peace and friendship." Peking characterized
the PFT as "a thorn in the flesh for the Soviet Union" and
229declared that "only Soviet social-imperialism is not happy."
Additionally, the Chinese see the Northern Territories as the
lever used by the USSR to coerce the Japanese into signing a
peace treaty with its northern neighbor, but that "the Soviet
demand for concluding the peace treaty harbors aggressive
, . ,,230designs against Japan.
The territorial issue presents the Chinese propagandists
with a line of reasoning (completely in line with the Americans)
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to induce Japan to increase its defense spending. The Peking
Daily carried an article that spelled out the threat and an
appropriate response:
The harsh reality has once again warned that dark
clouds are now gathering over the Japanese Islands and
that in the changing situation Japan is being threatened
by Soviet hegemonism. In confronting Soviet inroads into
the Japanese Islands, what should Japan do to cope with
the threat of aggression? ... Given these circumstances/
it is quite natural for the Japanese people to press for
a military buildup and reinforcement such as a defense
system compatible with self determination. 231
The Chinese cite the Russian desire for turning the Sea of
Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan into an extended "Soviet lake" and
the "neighborliness" of placing long range artillery and
assault helicopters directly adjacent to Japan as proof that
the Russians have military designs on Japan and that the Japan-
ese desperately need to address their defensive shortcomings.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union's ambition of world domination
has blinded its leaders to any appreciation of the Japanese
position on the Northern Territories, and Moscow plans to "take
full advantage of its geographical position and military
strength" to force Japan to yield to the Soviet point of
232
view. The Soviet drive for a treaty of good neighborliness
and cooperation is seen by Peking as a Russian attempt "to
233turn Japan into an eastern bulwark of Soviet hegemonism."
Imposition of the territorial problem by the Chinese into
the sphere of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation is also a
favorite tool of the Peking leadership. The Russian armed
forces on the islands are said to be there to "make Japan
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subservient to the Soviet Union politically and induce it to
provide technology and capital for the economic development
234
of Siberia. " The USSR is taking advantage of their military
strength in the region to "blackmail" Japan and is depending
on Japanese developmental cooperation in the Soviet Far East
and Siberia "in view of its aggravating shortage of industrial
235
resources." But the PRC warns Japan of the consequences of
relenting to Soviet pressures:
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, developing
Siberia is primarily aimed at rapidly strengthening its
military and economic position in the Far East. The
Japanese offer to open up Siberia is an act of helping
the Soviet Union expand its arms and prepare for war. 236
The annual Japanese-Soviet fishing negotiations are illustra-
tions/ say the Chinese, of further blackmail by Moscow. The
"new tsars' highhandedness" is exposed in trying to compel the
Japanese to yield on the territorial question by threatening
the lifeline of the Japanese fishing industry.
All of these attempts by the Chinese to portray the
Northern Territories problem in terms of Russian blackmailing
and desire for world domination are designed to solicit Japan-
ese cooperation in its "Four Modernizations" program, prevent
closer Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation, and induce Tokyo
to abandon any vestiges of its equidistance policy.
2. Soviet Hegemonism
The Northern Territories also provides the Chinese the
opportunity to expose to other nations the nature of Moscow's
hegemonistic design for world domination. Politburo member
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Yao Wan-yuan declared that Moscow's refusal to return the
Northern Territories or even discuss the issue was proof to
237
all of Soviet hegemonism. Japan's activities to return
23 8
the islands are "righteous acts of a sovereign nation."
But Moscow's goal, says' Peking, is world domination. Peking
asserts that this is what the Soviet Union has in mind when it
proposes to Japan a treaty of good neighborliness and coopera-
tion and what it has in mind for the rest of Asia when it pro-
poses an Asian collective security arrangement - collective
under Soviet domination, and with security only for the USSR.
The Chinese say that if the USSR really wanted good
relations with Japan, it would return the Northern Territories;
the implication is that Sino-Soviet relations may, in part,
depend on a satisfactory solution to China's own irredentist
claims. There is also the slightest trace of racism in the
Chinese criticisms; in citing the "arrogance" of the Russians
for not allowing Japanese to visit their ancestoral gravesites
in the Kuriles, Peking gives rise to the conveyance of non-
Asian Soviet insensitivity to Asian cultures and ways of life.
3 . Taiwan Claim
The PRC ' s desire to incorporate Taiwan into its polit-
ical sphere is also a motivation for the Chinese involvement
in Japan's territorial dispute with the USSR. By claiming
that Japan has an inalienable right to its inherent territory,
the Chinese underscore that they, too, have a right to their
inherent land - Taiwan. With the exception of a relativelv
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small group of Chinese who advocate that Taiwan should separate
from the mainland and become an independent nation, no Chinese,
communist or nationalist, subscribes to anything but the
position that Taiwan is an integral part of the Chinese nation.
The quid pro quo with Japan of honoring traditional territorial
integrity suits the purposes of both countries.
4. The Senkakus
The Senkaku Islands are a small eight-island group
south of the Ryukyus and north of Taiwan. They are claimed by
Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan. Taipei and Peking claim they are
part of Taiwan and thus Chinese, while Japan says they are
part of the Ryukyus. The Senkakus were administered by the
United States at the conclusion of World War II and used by
239them for bombing practice .in the 1950 's. But the problem in
no way evokes the same emotionalism as the Northern Territo-
ries problem. In fact, the whole controversy may never have
materialized except for the oil exploration that has been
going on in the East China Sea and all that that implies. A
confrontation between armed Chinese fishing boats and Japan-
ese patrol craft in April 1978 has been explained by Chinese
Defense Minister Geng Biao as accidental and unplanned and was
attributed to a dissident faction in China's eastern maritime
240provinces who had been hostile to the Deng regime. Although
there is a territorial issue between the two nations, China
and Japan have consciously decided that the Senkakus will not
effect their relations, and unlike the Northern Territories,




Korea, the renowned meeting place of the great powers in-
East Asia, is as divided over the Northern Territories ques-
tion as is the peninsula itself. The Republic of Korea (ROK)
,
or South Korea, has vociferously supported the Japanese claims
while the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) , or
North Korea, touts the Soviet line. However, the shifting
scene in the region has tended to mollify the stances of both
nations.
1. The Republic of Korea
The ROK ' s statements in support of the Japanese claims
against the USSR have equated the Soviet aggrandizement of the
Northern Territories and the expansion of communist forces to
its own threat from communist aggression to its immediate
north. The intent of the ROK is not to beneficently take the
side of Japan (who only in the recent past ended its own colo-
nial rule over the entire Korean peninsula) , but rather to hold-
up the communist ideology in front of world opinion as being a
ravenous predator seeking to gobble-up the territories of help-
less victims. Thus, the ROK can level like charges at its
northern counterpart.
The ROK, despite its history of staunch support for
the Japanese viewpoint in the Northern Territories, has
recently been conspicuously silent about the dispute. Its
position (along with the DPRK) as the crossroads of big-power
Asia has made the South Koreans distinctly aware of the impact
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of any political stands it takes involving its neighbors. The
ROK has, somewhat reluctantly, made Japan and cooperation with
241
the Japanese "the cornerstone of its Asia policy." Economic
intercourse has flourished, yet frictions remain. The legacy
of the Japanese colonial period, the legal status of the
600,000 Koreans that live in Japan, conservative Japanese sup-
port of Korean economic expansion and military contributions,
and other irritants are some of the problems that grace South
Korean-Japanese relations.
The ROK and Japan have their own territorial dispute
242
over Takeshima (Tok-to in Korean) . The small island in the
Sea of Japan, like the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkakus,
had little significance prior to the concentrated efforts of
oil exploration in the Japan Sea and the advent of the 200-
mile maritime economic zones. Unresolved by the 196 5 normaliza-
tion of relations between Japan and the ROK, the Takeshima
issue suffers from the same historical revisionism that sur-
rounds the Northern Territories. For the ROK to totally
support the concept of Japan's right to regain its inalienable
territory might soften its own claims to Takeshima.
ROK-Soviet relations must also be considered. The ROK
has traditionally been viewed by the Soviets as an American
puppet - a puppet that provides the U.S. with a basis for
involvement in East Asia and a nation, in its own right, that
has made significant economic gains. Recent relations appear
to have moved out of the Cold War stereotype; the USSR has
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243demonstrated a new willingness to accept a two-Korea policy.
The Soviets have, within the last decade, referred to the Seoul
244
regime by its proper name, the Republic of Korea. The South
Koreans have attended international conferences and athletic
events in the Soviet Union at Moscow's invitation. And South
Korea was surprisingly one of the few countries in the region
245
that supported Brezhnev's collective security plan. Still,
Moscow's support for the DPRK and its "traditional" communist
aims leads to Seoul's suspicions of the Soviet Union.
Like the Japanese, the South Koreans have territory-
related problems with the Russians. At the end of World War II
some 50,000 Koreans who were forceably relocated to Sakhalin
Island by their Japanese rulers fell under the administration
of the USSR. All efforts by the ROK to have them repatriated
246back to Korea have been ignored by the Soviets. Families
who were split during the war years have had to endure the
continued separation of their loved ones. Even postal service
from the ROK to the Sakhalin Koreans has been subject to the
whims of the Russians. South Korean fishermen, like their
Japanese counterparts, have had to contend with Soviet patrol
247
craft monitoring Russian fishing grounds. ROK boats are
sometimes seized and confiscated and crews returned only after
an all too lengthy stay in a Russian jail.
The Republic of Korea in the Northern Territories dis-
pute, at least within recent times, has taken the position
that it is best to remain silent. The less said about an
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emotional problem that involves two of its powerful neighbors
the better.
2. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The DPRK has stridently supported the Soviet claims
to the Northern Territories and opposed the revanchist claims
248
of the "ruling circles of the Japanese reactionaries."
And yet, like the ROK, the North Koreans have toned-down their
criticism of the Japanese over the matter in the recent past.
Their reluctance to interject themselves into a bilateral
controversy that involves the military and economic giants of
the region is understandable, for both will impact greatly on
the future of the DPRK.
Post-war Japan has consistently been viewed by Pyongyang
as an instrument of the United States' designs in Northeast
Asia. It has reacted harshly to Japan's "becoming deeper em-
broiled by each step in the U.S. imperialists' Korean and Asian
strategies and joining the U.S. imperialists in preparations
249for another war of aggression in Asia." North Korean rhet-
oric accuses Tokyo of embarking upon a "new Japanese militarism"
and acquiescing to U.S. demands to be used as "shock troops"
against the DPRK. Yet the North Koreans do not want to totally
alienate the Japanese. Japan presents the Pyongyang regime
with a window to the rest of the world, a potential source for
economic assistance, and a medium for expanding diplomatic
relations. Whether the DPRK will attempt to employ the Japan-
ese in any of these manners remains to be seen, but to discard
135

the Japanese as useless and totally antagonistic would seem
foolhardy.
Soviet-North Korean relations are an enigma. Pyongyang
knows that its economic and military bread is buttered in the
USSR. Despite President Kim II Sung ' s "Juche" (self-reliance)
program, the Soviet Union provides a considerable amount of
this type of aid , far more than any other nation including the
PRC. In return, the Soviets have been able to check further
Chinese influence in the country and have begun to use the
North Korean port of Najin (northeast coast) as a naval port-
of-call, its first extensive use coming during the Sino-
Vietnamese border war of 1979 and emergency shipments by the
250Russians to Haiphong. Scattered reports have also surfaced
that Najin is being considered as a submarine base for the
Pacific Fleet. Yet North Korea must balance its policy between
the two continental colossuses of Russia and China. Hence,
North Korean support of Soviet activities has not been a knee-
jerk response. In a February 1980 socialist bloc parliamentary
conference in Sofia, the DPRK abstained from voting on a motion
supporting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; in a Septem-
ber 1980 meeting of the same body in East Berlin, Pyongyang
abstained from voting on a resolution criticizing the
251invasion. Kampuchea's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a personal
friend of Kim II Sung and a frequent resident of Pyongyang,
reported that Kim was deeply shaken by the Afghanistan invasion
252
and that it reinforced his distrust of the Soviet Union.
136

As this balancing act pertains to the Northern Territo-
ries problem, the DPRK, like the ROK, has been more than content
to let the Soviets and the Japanese settle the issue. Occa-
sionally Pyongyang will denounce the Japanese and their side
of the issue, as during the furor over the Russian arming of
Shikotan:
Of late, Japanese official propaganda has been resort-
ing to the most refined methods to condition the mass of
the people, above all the youth, to the idea of an alleged
"Soviet threat", making the people believe that the actions
of the Japanese militarists, which led to military failure,
were mainly "correct" and that one must now prepare once
again for an "emergency . "253
Both the ROK and the DPRK have, in recent times, of-
ficially ignored the Northern Territories problem. No doubt,
both closely watch the state of affairs as it pertains to
their own national interests. But both are quite clearly in
a wait-and-see mode, not willing to insert themselves into a




VIII. A PROGNOSIS FOR RESOLUTION
A. NEAR TERM
The likelihood of the Northern Territories problem being
solved to the acceptable satisfaction of both nations is, in
the near term and under the present circumstances, indeed
remote. The Japanese press reports even the slightest var-
iance in the Soviet position as if it were a great breakthrough
Once when Foreign Minister Sonoda returned from Moscow where
talks were held on the dispute (January 197 8) , he was quoted as
saying that he considered the return of the islands "was not
254
necessarily an impossibility." The Japanese press went
wild with stories that a solution to the territorial dispute
was at hand. Another uproar was caused by a member of the
Supreme Soviet when he said, "... let us place a comma on the
255territorial problem and not a period." Any statement by a
Soviet official concerning the Northern Territories that does
not mention the word "settled" is considered to display a
"flexible stand.
"
But despite sensationalistic reporting, the cold facts of
reality tell another story. Political, economic, and military
rationality call for the Russians to hold on to the islands.
Politically the islands represent a token of leverage against
the Japanese; although poorly timed and frequently hishandled
in the past, the Northern Territories have been used as an
instrument in an attempt to modify Japanese international
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behavior. Economically, they provide a significant portion of
the Soviet fishing resources, while denying them to the
Japanese. And militarily, they guarantee an access to the
open ocean, provide surveillance platforms, and offer staging
areas for potential operations against Japan. The arming of
the islands with ground troops is particularly significant; it
indicates the resolve of the Soviets (at least in the near
term) to retain the islands in the face of what it sees as
unfavorable circumstances. Currently, nothing could be gained
for the USSR if it decided to yield to Japanese demands except
a slight abatement of the animosity felt for the Russians by
the Japanese. But there is plenty of animosity already en-
grained that would make such mood transitory.
The Japanese position seems as intractable as that of the
Soviets. Politically, the mere suggestion of the abandonment
of the Northern Territories as a national cause would be dis-
asterous for any Japanese politician. The relations with the
People's Republic of China and with the United States dictate
the continued maintenance of an unflinching resolve on the
matter. Further, the Japanese are not likely to be moved by
promises of Soviet economic concessions; the Japanese commit-
ment to the capitalist economic system and a reluctance to
become dependent on Soviet-controlled resources, coupled with
an historic mistrust of the Russian nation, militate against a
significant modification of the Japanese position.
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The prognosis for the near term is a continuation of the
present stalemate.
B. LONG TERM
A solution to the Northern Territories problem should not
be considered an impossibility, for today's conditions are not
likely to remain static into the next century. Under what
conditions would the Soviets return all or part of the islands
or at least agree to discuss the problem? The contention here
is that the Soviets will not shift their position unless they
feel as though they have an excellent opportunity to woo the
Japanese away from the influence of the United States and, to
a lesser degree, the People's Republic of China. Under present
conditions that does not appear to be a logical possibility.
But circumstances, such as any of the following, could change
that:
(1) Economic warfare - a breakdown of the U.S. -Western
Europe-Japan economic system; Malthusian resource constraints;
trade protectionism; a return to nationalistic merchantilistic
mentalities.
(2) Political turnaround - an abrogation of the U.S. -Japan
Defense Treaty due to economic warfare, the Japanese popula-
tion's refusal to do more for its own defense, and/or over-
riding American commitments in other global regions;
disillusionment with economic relations with the PRC; the rise
to power in Japan of a political force favorable to the USSR,
antagonistic to the U.S. and the PRC.
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(3) Resource access - the threatened failure of the global
system to support Japan with adequate natural resources; en-
ticements by the Soviet Union to the Siberian and Far Eastern
resources; impositions of embargoes of goods going to Japan.
(4) A stronger Japan - a militarily rearmed Japan (with
nuclear weapons) ; a weakened USSR due to conflicts elsewhere
in the world or domestic revolt; as a consequence, the Soviet
desire to placate a strong neighbor and a Japanese refusal to
tolerate the continued Soviet occupation of the Northern
Territories.
Admittedly, some of the conditions listed above seem far-
fetched, yet some may one day become all too real. One thing
that is certain is that there will be change. A combination
of some of the above, to whatever degree, may cause the Soviet
Union and Japan to reconsider their stance on the Northern
Territories. The intriguing question is what part, if any,
could the territorial dispute play in enhancing or retarding
the development of any of the above conditions.
C. THE SHAPE OF CHANGE
The changing of positions on the Northern Territories may
take several forms and might manifest itself in one of the six
following courses of action:
(1) Discussing the problem - The Soviet Union gains nothing
except the ire of Japan (and the denunciation of China) by
claiming that no territorial problem exists. An effort by the
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Russians to at least discuss the problem may help ease ten-
sions between the two and provide the opportunity for an
eventual solution.
(2) Return of the Habomais alone - The Habomais have no
strategic or tactical military value. They are too small for
airfields and troop concentrations and are relatively isolated
from the Kunashir Channel. Although they are trading material
from the Soviet perspective/ any Japanese negotiator would have
a difficult time selling a proposal to his government that
would reclaim only a very small portion of the disputed lands.
(3) Return of the Habomais and Shikotan - Basically, this
is the Hirasawa proposal (see Chapter VI) . A return of these
islands was first promised in 1956 in the Joint Declaration
of Peace, and their reversion would be a boost to Japanese
diplomatic stature and a generous concession by the Soviets.
Shikotan does have tactical military value (an airfield, harbor,
troop facilities, and close to the Kunashir Channel) and as
such would be difficult to obtain Soviet agreement.
(4) Return of the entire Northern Territories - Given
today's circumstances, this possibility can be realized only
as a result of a monumental transformation of the Russian
national paradigm. The Russian distrust of the Japanese,
their concept of territorial aggrandizement, their preoccupa-
tion with security matters, and their sincere belief that the
Northern Territories belong to them as a result of their
efforts during the "Great Patriotic War" all make it highly
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improbable that the USSR will ever voluntarily relinquish
control of the southern Kuriles.
(5) Dismissing the problem - Of course, the Soviets would
agree to this; and conversely, this solution presupposes a
change in the outlook of the Japanese. The Japanese' adamant
stand is based on their historical claims, their commitment
to the economic and political philosophies common to the West,
their domestic political considerations, their search for
international friends and security, and the burning mistrust
and hatred for the Russians. As in (4) , this solution appears
highly unlikely.
(6) Deterioration of the Japanese position - Should Japan
continue to discard the path of military revitalization and
U.S. support for Japan drastically decline, increased pressure
by the Soviet Union may cause not only the Japanese abandon-
ment of any claims in the Northern Territories, but also the
granting of concessions to the Russians in other areas (tech-
nology, capital useage, preferential trade agreements, etc.).
It should be noted that the Russians had at one time (through
early explorers and trappers) laid claims in and around parts
of Hokkaido
.
So where does this leave the controversy? Right where it
has always been, in a stalemate. Hirasawa's plan was as
rational and progressive as could be expected. And yet, it
was soundly refuted by the Japanese and ignored by the
Russians. The strident rhetoric, the diplomatic machinations,
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the military maneuvers, and the propagandistic ballyhoo have
committed each side to a stance that appears to be intractable.
Finally, what if the problem were solved? What would the
global and regional implications of a demonstrative improvement
in Japanese-Soviet relations involve? It is beyond the scope
of this thesis to explore all of the possible ramifications of
such an event. Perhaps former Japanese Prime Minister Miki
said it best when he declared, "If the territorial problem
could be solved, the resulting Soviet-Japanese cooperation




The Northern Territories are not really the major obstacle
to increased Japanese-Soviet "good neighborliness and
cooperation." The territorial issue is only a symptomatic
manifestation of the basic disparities of their national
paradigms. As has previously been mentioned, if the Northern
Territories did not exist, there would most likely be some
other issue that would prevent closer relations. Professor
Young C. Kim feels that the realization of a significant im-
provement in Japanese-Soviet relations will occur "only under
257
an extraordinary combination of several circumstances":
(1) A major realignment of Japanese domestic political
forces
.
(2) A radical reorientation and restructuring of exist-
ing Japanese patterns of trade and economic ties.
(3) A significant deterioration in Japanese relations
with the United States and/or China.
(4) A sharp decrease in the profound distrust that the
Japanese have for the Russians.
All of the above circumstances, while possible, seem
unlikely to occur. Although the LDP has in recent times dis-
played a tenuous hold on the control of the Diet, the con-
servative force in Japan is strong, and a coalition of
political forces making an appreciable shift in the direction
of radical social, economic, and diplomatic change is highly
improbable. Although there are certainly pitfalls and poten-
tial problems on Japan's economic and trade horizons, the
Japanese economic "miracle" is fact. The Japanese success
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story is the country's greatest stabilizer. The perpetuation
of that phenomenon is dependent on Japan's ability to continue
to operate harmoniously within the present international
economic system.
The dependence on the United States for its security (with
confluence of Chinese security objectives) is widely held
throughout Japan as a necessity. Even the opposition parties,
who for years have promoted a campaign to abolish the Mutual
Defense Treaty / have acknowledged that defense ties with the
United States are useful.
But the biggest obstacle to improving Japanese-Soviet rela-
tions is the legacy of their historical experiences. The
Soviets remember the Japanese surprise attack on their naval
forces at Port Arthur and the Russian people's shameful defeat
by an Asian nation; they remember the Siberian Intervention
led by the Japanese and Tokyo's early anti-bolshivism; they
remember the Manchurian border clashes of the late 1930 's and
the rise of Japanese militarism; they are concerned over the
massive economic, technological, and increasing (from their
perspective) military power that is displayed in Japan; and
they understand the significance of the Sino-Japanese Peace
and Friendship Treaty and its anti-hegemony clause. For their
part, the Japanese remember the Liaotung "Triple Intervention",
Russian interference in Korea, the "treacherous" Soviet attack
in 1945, the disappearance of tens of thousands of its prisoners
of war while in Soviet captivity, the military and political
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threats to Japan's sovereignty, and the Northern Territories.
As a result, the Soviet Union has consistently been rated the
2 5 8
"most hated" country in the world by the Japanese public.
I do not believe that the profound consequences of these
historical dealings can be overdrawn.
Japan is culturally different from the United States, yet
there are close ties. Japan has territorial disputes with the
People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea but con-
tinues to have relatively good relations with both. Japan and
Western Europe have economic problems, but there are no overt
hostilities. The ASEAN nations and Australia have witnessed
the march of Japanese militarism, yet they, too, have progres-
sive relations with Japan. The Soviet Union alone is regarded
as the "potential threat" to Japan. The assessment is based
on Russian military power, Japanese apprehensions about Soviet
intentions, a perception of the Soviet threat as shared (and
enhanced) by the United States, and the debilitating effects
of their historical experience. The Northern Territories prob-
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A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE
NORTHERN TERRITORIES DISPUTE
Feb. 1855 Treaty of Shimoda; Kuriles legally divided
between Russia and Japan; Sakhalin co-owned.
May 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg; all of the Kuriles
to Japan, all of Sakhalin to Russia.
1904-05 Russo-Japanese War; Japan gets southern
Sakhalin and right to fish in Russian waters
Aug. 1925 First airfield established on Iturup.
Nov. -Dec. 1941 Iturup' s Hitokoppu Bay is used as a mar-
shalling area for the naval force to be
used at Pearl Harbor.
June 1942 Paramishir-based amphibious forces attack
the western Aleutians.
July 1943 U.S. bombers first attack the Kuriles.
Nov. 1943 Cairo Conference; Japan to forfeit all
territory gained by "violence and greed."
Nov. 1943 Teheran Conference; President remarks that
the Kuriles had been awarded to Japan as a
result of the Russo-Japanese War.
Feb. 1944 First U.S. naval bombardment of the Kuriles.
Dec. 1944 Stalin tells U.S. envoy Averell Harriman
that the Kuriles should be "returned" to
the USSR.
Feb. 194 5 Yalta Conference; "The Kurile Islands shall
be handed over to the Soviet Union."
July 1945 The Potsdam Conference.
Aug. 1945 The Pacific War ends; the Kuriles are
invaded by the Soviet Union; Japan accepts
the Potsdam Declaration limiting it to the
four major islands and such minor islands
as the Allies would determine.
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20 Sep. 1945 The Kuriles are declared to be Soviet
territory.
Jan. 1946 The secret provisions of the Yalta Confer-
ence are made public.
25 Feb. 1947 The Kuriles (to include Shikotan and the
Habomais) are formally integrated as a
component of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
Dec. 1949 First Japanese official statement claiming
the Northern Territories.
Dec. 1950 The PRC announces its support for the USSR's
claim to the Northern Territories.
Sep. 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference; Japan re-
nounces any claims to the Kuriles; Japan
declares that the Northern Territories are
not part of the Kuriles.
Sep. 1956 U.S. issues an aide-memoire to Tokyo support-
ing Japanese claims to the Northern Ter-
ritories .
Oct. 1956 Japanese-Soviet Peace Declaration signed;
Soviets agree to return the Habomais and
Shikotan upon consummation of a peace
treaty.
Jan. 1960 Soviets state that all foreign troops must
leave Japan before any islands can be
returned.
June 1960 Soviet ground troops withdraw from the
Northern Territories.
Dec. 1961 Premier Krushchev declares the issue is
"settled."
May 1964 Soviets allow Japanese to visit ancestors'
graves on Shikotan and the Habomais with
only Japanese identification cards required
for entry.




Sep. 1964 Krushchev states that the sole reason for
the delay in returning the territories
claimed by Japan is the presence of U.S.
troops and bases in Japan.
May 1970 Japanese Ministry of Education orders all
textbooks to portray the Northern Territo-
ries as part of Japan.
Jan. 197 2 Gromyko offers to return the Habomais and
Shikotan in exchange for Japan's renuncia-
tion of claims to Iturup and Kunashir and
adherence to Brezhnev's collective security
plan; offer is rejected.
May 1972 Okinawa returns to Japanese sovereignty.
Oct. 1973 Tanaka-Brezhnev summit meeting; Japan leaves
with the impression that the Northern Ter-
ritories issue is still negotiable.
Apr. 1975 Okean II Soviet military exercises.
Oct. 1975 Kazushige Hirasawa's Northern Territories
solution is published.
Jan. 197 6 Gromyko offers to exchange Shikotan and the
Habomais for a Japanese promise not to sign
a treaty with the PRC that contains an anti-
hegemony clause; offer is rejected.
Sep. 1976 Foreign Minister Miyazawa's "inspection"
tour of the Northern Territories; Soviets
reinstitute the policy of requiring pass-
ports and visas to visit graves on Shikotan
and the Habomais.
Mar. 1977 Japan and the USSR declare 200-mile economic
zones
.
May 1977 Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Agreement.
Feb. 1978 Soviets unilaterally publish a proposed
treaty of "friendship and good neighbor-
liness"; there is no mention in the proposed
treaty of the territorial dispute; Japanese
reject the offer.
May-June 197 8 Soviet military maneuvers around the Northern
Territories; first Soviet troops stationed in
the Northern Territories since 1960.
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12 Aug. 1978 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.
Jan. 1979 The JDA announces that Soviet troop levels
in the Northern Territories have risen to
5,000.
May 197 9 Soviet troops are deployed to Shikotan.
Sep. 1979 U.S. intelligence sources present informa-
tion to the Japanese government concerning
the Soviet military buildup in Shikotan;
the JDA announces that Soviet troop levels
in the Northern Territories have risen to
10,000.
Sep. 1980 Japan brings the Northern Territories issue
before the UN General Assembly.
Dec. 1980 The JDA announces that new airfields are
being constructed on Iturup.
Feb. 1981 Japanese Diet proclaims 7 February as an
annual "Northern Territories Day."
Sep. 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki conducts an "inspec-
tion" of the Northern Territories; Diet
mission visits European countries and the






THE TREATY OF SHIMODA, 7 FEBRUARY 18 55 (EXTRACT)
Article II
Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan will
pass between the islands Iturup and Uruppu. The whole island
of Iturup belongs to Japan and the whole island of Uruppu and
the other Kurile Islands to the north constitute possessions
of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto (Sakhalin) , it re-
mains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been the
case up to this time.
Source: George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan





THE TREATY OF ST. PETERSBURG,
7 MAY 1875 (EXTRACT)
Article II
In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the
island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His Majesty
the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His descendants,
cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of the Kurile
Islands which he possesses at present, together with all the
rights of sovereignty appertaining to this possession, so that
henceforth the said group of Kurile Islands will belong to the
Empire of Japan ... so that the boundary between the Empires of
Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the strait
between Cape Lopatka of the peninsula of Kamchatka and the
island of Shimushu.
Source: George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan





THE CAIRO DECLARATION, 27 NOVExMBER 194 3 (EXTRACT)
The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain
and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It
is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all islands
in the Pacific which she has seized and occupied since the
beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the
territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as
Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to
the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.
Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1943 , the Conferences of Cairo




THE YALTA AGREEMENT, 11 FEBRUARY 194 5 (EXTRACT)
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treach-
erous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
a. The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all
islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the
Soviet Union.
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
Union.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled
after Japan has been defeated.
Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, the Conferences at Malta and




THE POTSDAM DECLARATION, 26 JULY 194 5 (EXTRACT)
8 . The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried
out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands
of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands
as we determine.
Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam),




THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY, 8 SEPTEMBER 19 51 (EXTRACT)
Article II
c. Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the
Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands
adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a con-
sequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.
Source: United States, Department of State, United States
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952





THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIDE-MEMOIRE ON YALTA, KURILES 7 SEPTEMBER 1956
(EXTRACT)
With respect to the territorial question, as the Japanese
Government has been previously informed, the United States
regards the so-called Yalta Agreement as simply a statement of
common purposes by the then heads of the participating powers,
and not as a final determination by those powers or of any
legal effect in transferring territories. The San Francisco
Peace Treaty (which conferred no rights on the Soviet Union
because it refused to sign) did not determine the sovereignty
of the territories renounced by Japan, leaving the question,
as was stated by the Delegate of the United States at San
Francisco, to "international solvents other than this treaty."
It is the considered opinion of the United States that by
virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan does not have
the right to transfer sovereignty over the territories re-
nounced by it therein. In the opinion of the United States,
the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty would not be bound
to accept any action of this character and would presumably
reserve all their rights thereunder.
The United States has reached the conclusion after careful
examination of the historical facts that the islands of Iturup
and Kunashir (along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan
which are a part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan
162

proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese
sovereignty. The United States would regard Soviet Agreement
to this effect as a positive contribution to the reduction of
tension in the Far East.






JAPANESE-SOVIET JOINT DECLARATION OF PEACE
19 OCTOBER 195 6 (EXTRACT)
9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan
agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic
relations between the Union of Soviet socialist Republics and
Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.
In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into
consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to
transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of
Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to
take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.
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